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    {
      "Title": "authType cert: X.509 client-certificate logon for technical users (no password, no browser)",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`tls.cert` / `tls.key` / `tls.pfx` exist per destination, but only as transport material under `basic`, `sso` or `oauth`. An on-premise system that maps X.509 certificates to users (CERTRULE / VUSREXTID) can log a user on with the certificate alone, and a technical user with a certificate on disk is the on-premise equivalent of the OAuth client-credentials mode: unattended, no password, no browser. Today that setup is impossible: `basic` demands a password and `sso` opens a browser.\n\n##…",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/williansaez/abap-adt-mcp/issues/41",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-09-14T18:33:23.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
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    {
      "Title": "SLC path: validate and harden browser SSO against on-premise systems with client certificates and Kerberos",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\nSAP Secure Login Client (SLC) puts a short-lived X.509 user certificate into the OS key store (Windows certificate store, macOS Keychain) with a non-exportable private key. Chromium already uses that store for TLS client authentication, so the existing `sso` mode is the natural SLC path: the browser presents the certificate, the ABAP system logs the user on, and the server harvests the session cookies. The private key never leaves the OS store and the server only holds cookies in…",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/williansaez/abap-adt-mcp/issues/40",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-09-14T18:33:21.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
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    {
      "Title": "VS Code rejects every chat request: five tool schemas declare arrays without items",
      "Excerpt": "Found while running Phase 1 of #17 (#18) on Windows 11, VS Code with Copilot agent mode, `MCP_TOOLSETS=focused`, abap-adt-mcp 2.1.1 from npm.\n\n## Symptom\n\nThe server starts (\"Running, 114 tools, 6 prompts\"), but the first chat request fails before any tool runs:\n\n```\nFailed to validate tool mcp_abap-adt-mcp_nodeContents: Error: tool parameters array type must have items. Please open an issue for the MCP server or extension which provides this tool\n```\n\nVS Code refuses the whole request, so the…",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/williansaez/abap-adt-mcp/issues/54",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-09-28T19:13:21.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
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    {
      "Title": "Make the certificate error teach the fix instead of printing a Node code",
      "Excerpt": "When a destination fails TLS verification the caller sees the raw Node code (`UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE`, `SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN`, `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`, `CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`). Someone meeting an on-prem system for the first time has no way to know what to do next, and the search results all say to turn verification off. That is the real reason `insecureTls` gets used: it is the only option people find.\n\n`classifyAdtError` should recognise these codes and answer with the fix,…",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/williansaez/abap-adt-mcp/issues/14",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-09-04T13:13:50.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
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    {
      "Title": "Add tls.servername so systems reached by IP keep certificate verification",
      "Excerpt": "A destination whose `url` is an IP address, or a short hostname, fails verification even when `tls.ca` is correct. The CA answers \"who signed this certificate\"; the failure here is the other question, \"is this certificate for the name I asked for\".\n\nMeasured against a live tenant:\n\n| Connection | Result |\n|---|---|\n| by IP, verification on | fails, `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` |\n| by IP, with the correct CA | fails the same way |\n| by IP, with `servername` | passes, verification still on |…",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/williansaez/abap-adt-mcp/issues/13",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-09-04T13:13:28.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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