{
  "SchemaVersion": "1",
  "Kind": "DirectoryIssues",
  "Slug": "dns",
  "Name": "dns",
  "CanonicalUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/dns/issues",
  "ServerUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/dns",
  "IssueTotal": 75,
  "Held": 23,
  "Issues": [
    {
      "Title": "M365 identity_secops: bv-mcp-side tracking for live Graph reads (upstream: bv-web-prod#2276, decision: #759)",
      "Excerpt": "Follow-up from #403 (M365 proxy repointed at bv-web-prod, shipped in bv-mcp PR #415 + bv-web-prod #467). The repoint cleared the `m365_proxy_404` by pointing the 4 `identity_secops` tools (`query_signins`, `query_ual`, `get_ca_policies`, `assess_coverage`) at a real bv-web-prod internal route — but that route currently returns a `representative: true` **seam**, not live Microsoft Graph data. Three follow-ups:\n\n### 1. Live Microsoft Graph reads (feature)\nbv-web-prod has a real M365 engine (`share",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/417",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-19T01:26:58.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 8,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "v3.58.0 live-verification follow-ups: timeout guidance names the wrong source, Certspotter no longer attempted, BV_CERTSTREAM bound but reports not-consulted",
      "Excerpt": "Found by live verification of v3.58.0 immediately after deploy (version `f89d6101`, 100%). #734's fix verifies correctly; these are defects in #735's messaging that I shipped, plus one observation that needs investigating before anyone trusts the new `BV_CERTSTREAM` binding.\n\n## 1. Source-specific measurements are attributed to whichever source timed out\n\nLive output for `meta.com` **and** `anthropic.com`:\n\n```\ncrtsh timed out — this is deterministic for this domain, not transient, so an identic",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/738",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-20T20:35:04.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 5,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "MCP best-practices audit: deferred items + corpus-split finding (follow-up to #362)",
      "Excerpt": "Follow-up tracking issue from the MCP best-practices audit. PR #362 shipped Findings 1 (transient-DNS resilience) and 3 (tool descriptions). These remaining items were **deliberately held** — each is a public-contract or product decision, not a mechanical fix — plus one finding discovered while implementing #362.\n\n## 1. Discovered: transient-DNS handling is split across two incompatible shapes\n**Severity: low–medium (latent correctness + stale docs).**\n\nDuring #362 we found `check_*` checks hand",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/363",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-04T03:39:49.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 5,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Unprovisioned / tier-denied OSINT + recon tools return `passed: true, score: 100`",
      "Excerpt": "An unavailable lane returns a result that reads as a clean pass. A consumer keying on `passed`/`score` — a dashboard, a proposal generator, or an LLM skimming the response — records \"no findings\" where **no measurement was performed**.\n\n### Observed (hosted deployment, 2026-08-18, v3.52.0)\n\n```json\n{\"category\":\"osint_investigation\",\"passed\":true,\"score\":100,\n \"findings\":[{\"category\":\"osint_investigation\",\"title\":\"OSINT investigation unavailable\",\n \"severity\":\"info\",\"detail\":\"OSINT domain investi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/695",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-18T10:03:50.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 4,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_dnssec_chain: false 'unverified root' from cached transient-empty (edge-cache hypothesis refuted)",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\n`check_dnssec_chain` reports a false **HIGH \"Broken DNSSEC chain at .\"** for every correctly-signed domain in **production**, because the root (and TLD) `DNSKEY`/`DS` DoH queries return **empty** in prod — even though the records exist.\n\nSurfaced during the full-tool QA pass. Reproduced on cloudflare.com and ietf.org (both broke at `.`, walk stopped at the TLD).\n\n## Root cause — isolated to the prod edge, NOT the code\n\nA real-network test in the **workerd** runtime (same engine as pr",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/199",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-24T08:26:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 4,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_dane_https scores a STALE TLSA pin as 100 — presence is checked, correctness is not",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\n`check_dane_https` scores a TLSA record **100 / \"Valid TLSA record configured\"** without verifying that the pinned hash matches the certificate the host actually serves. A stale DANE-EE pin — which actively breaks every DANE-validating client — is reported as a pass.\n\nFound by scanning our own production domain during a zone audit on 2026-08-30.\n\n## Evidence\n\n`blackveilsecurity.com` published `_443._tcp` TLSA `3 1 1` (DANE-EE / SPKI / SHA-256):\n\n```\npinned SPKI sha256:  b5d294f0346bc",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/841",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-30T06:42:34.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_ssl and check_ptr time out against fastmail.com in a full scan",
      "Excerpt": "Found by a live post-deploy accuracy sweep of prod 3.43.0.\n\n## Observed\n\n`scan_domain(fastmail.com, force_refresh: true)`:\n\n```json\n\"checkStatuses\": {\"ssl\": \"timeout\", \"ptr\": \"timeout\", ...},\n\"inconclusiveCategories\": [\"ssl\", \"ptr\"],\n\"categoryScores\": {\"ssl\": null, \"ptr\": null},\n\"evidence\": {\"attempted\": 19, \"completed\": 17, \"ratio\": 0.894...}\n```\n\nTwo of nineteen checks timed out against a major, highly-available mail provider. The same scan completed all other 17 checks normally, and `blackvei",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/641",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-07T01:42:28.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Harden finding-metadata sanitizer: C1 control block + Unicode vectors + dead ANSI ordering (follow-up to #389)",
      "Excerpt": "Follow-up from the review of #389 (`createFinding` metadata chokepoint, shipped in #416 / dns-checks 1.3.17). The chokepoint closes the verbatim-metadata hole; the sanitizer (`packages/dns-checks/src/scoring/metadata-sanitize.ts`) has known residual gaps — **none are regressions** (same gaps exist in the `detail`-channel `sanitizeDnsData`), but worth closing at the now-authoritative chokepoint.\n\n### 1. Dead `ANSI_ESCAPE` ordering (MEDIUM)\n`CONTROL_BYTES` strips `\\x1B` (ESC, in `\\x0E-\\x1F`) befor",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/421",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-19T02:42:11.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "@blackveil/dns-checks version has been frozen at 1.27.0 across three scoring-model bumps — the version no longer identifies the code",
      "Excerpt": "`packages/dns-checks/package.json` and `PARITY_CORPUS_VERSION` are both **1.27.0**, and have been since #794. Since then `SCORING_MODEL_VERSION` has advanced **three times**:\n\n| model | shipped in | dns-checks source it changed | package version |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 1.13.0 | — | — | bumped to 1.24.0 by #777, then 1.27.0 by #794 |\n| 1.14.0 | | scoring | **1.27.0** |\n| 1.15.0 | 3.70.0 (#846) | `scoring/classifiers/dmarc.ts`, `parity-fixtures.ts` | **1.27.0** |\n| 1.16.0 | 3.71.0 (#850) | `",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/855",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-30T19:25:18.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "DMARC check recommends aspf=s unconditionally — the advice breaks mail on any ESP-relayed domain",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\n`check_dmarc` emits **\"Relaxed SPF alignment — Consider `aspf=s` (strict) for stronger authentication\"** whenever `aspf` is relaxed or unset, with no regard for whether the domain's envelope-from (return-path) domain can ever align strictly with its `From` domain.\n\nFor any domain that sends through an ESP — Resend, SendGrid, Mailchimp, Postmark, SES-with-a-subdomain-MAIL-FROM — the return path sits on a **subdomain**, so `aspf=s` guarantees SPF alignment failure on 100% of that traff",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/842",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-30T06:42:57.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_ssl asserts \"HSTS properly configured\" (score 100, controlPresent:true) on any apex that redirects over HTTPS — the header is never read",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\n`check_ssl` emits its affirmative HSTS finding from the **absence of findings**, not from observing the header. For any apex that answers `https://` with a redirect to another HTTPS URL, the HSTS header is **never read at all** — so the check returns `passed: true`, `score: 100`, `controlPresent: true` and the text *\"HSTS header is properly configured\"* for a domain publishing no HSTS header.\n\nThis is a false **affirmative**, the dangerous direction, and it is the same class as #705 ",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/839",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-29T09:56:22.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_lookalikes: throttled run publishes a CONTRARY ownership attribution instead of unmeasured (jcpenny.com: third_party at 63/94 unresolved, owned_by_seed at 1/94)",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\nUnder throttling, `check_lookalikes` publishes a **contrary ownership attribution** instead of declining to attribute. A run with 63 of 94 candidate lookups unresolved reported `jcpenny.com` as `third_party` with the detail \"no ownership signal links it to this organisation\" — the signals weren't absent, they were **unfetched**. Near-complete runs of the same scan report `owned_by_seed` on a full 8/8 nameserver match.\n\n## Measurement (2026-08-29, three sequential `force_refresh:true`",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/832",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T22:17:35.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_lookalikes: registered-but-dark lookalike (NS, no A/MX) is invisible — 'held and dark' collapses into silence (febreeze.com, 3/3 runs)",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\nA lookalike domain that is **registered but deliberately dark** (NS present, no A, no MX) is invisible in `check_lookalikes` output: it passes candidate generation and NS resolution, then the findings gate drops it silently because it has neither A nor MX. \"Held and dark\" and \"unregistered\" are opposite custody facts, but the tool's output renders them identically — as silence.\n\n## Measurement (2026-08-29)\n\n- `febreeze.com` (the doubled-e cognitive misspelling of `febreze.com`) is ge",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/831",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T22:17:34.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_root_server_set: unvalidated probe response can throw an uncaught TypeError (evidence.rootHints read unconditionally)",
      "Excerpt": "Found during PR #827's work (root-server-set vacuous-pass fix), out of that PR's scope.\n\n`fetchRootServerSetEvidence()` (`src/lib/authoritative-dns-infra/probe-client.ts`) performs no runtime schema validation on the infra-probe response, and `rootHintsMatchOfficial()` (`src/lib/authoritative-dns-infra/analyze-root-server-set.ts`) calls `evidence.rootHints.length` unconditionally. A probe response that omits `rootHints` entirely therefore throws an uncaught `TypeError` inside `analyzeRootServerS",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/828",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T13:02:46.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_rbl: dead SORBS zone counted as a deterministic clean verdict — effective coverage is 6 RBLs, not 7",
      "Excerpt": "## Symptom (validation sweep 2026-08-28/29, google.com and blackveilsecurity.com)\n\n`check_rbl` claims *\"All checked IPs for <domain> are clean on 7 RBLs.\"* with `metadata.zones` including `\"dnsbl.sorbs.net\"` and `\"confidence\": \"deterministic\"`.\n\n## Ground truth: the SORBS zone no longer exists\n\nSORBS shut down in mid-2024; the entire domain NXDOMAINs, cross-resolver:\n\n```\ncurl dns.google  \"2.0.0.127.dnsbl.sorbs.net A\"       → Status 3  (universal test point NOT listed)\ncurl dns.google  \"dnsbl.so",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/814",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T12:21:42.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_srv: description promises directory coverage no prefix probes, and asserts a domain-wide \"No SRV records\" negative beyond its probe set",
      "Excerpt": "Two related coverage/wording defects in `check_srv`, both verified against live DNS (validation sweep 2026-08-28/29). Neither is a lookup bug — every SRV target/port the tool did report matched ground truth verbatim.\n\n## 1. Description promises \"directory\" coverage; no directory prefix is probed\n\nTool description: *\"probing ~16 common SRV record prefixes (email, calendar, messaging, web, directory)\"*. `SRV_PREFIXES` (`src/tools/srv-analysis.ts:10-30`) contains **no directory prefix at all** — no",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/813",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T12:21:40.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_authoritative_dns_infra: \"checks passed / satisfied all conclusive capability checks\" emitted when all 22 capabilities were inconclusive (split from #786)",
      "Excerpt": "Split out of #786 per its closing comment (\"The second item in this issue — `check_authoritative_dns_infra` finding **prose** reading 'checks passed' while its fields report nothing measured — is untouched by this release; reopen or split if you want it tracked separately.\").\n\n## Symptom (observed live on 3.67.0, 2026-08-28/29, google.com AND cloudflare.com)\n\n`check_authoritative_dns_infra` returns a finding titled **\"Authoritative DNS infrastructure checks passed\"** with detail *\"Infra probe ev",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/812",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T12:21:39.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_resolver_consistency: TXT comparison always reports SPLIT_HORIZON — Cloudflare DoH quote-wrapping never normalized",
      "Excerpt": "## Symptom (validation sweep 2026-08-28/29, live prod 3.67.0)\n\n`check_resolver_consistency` reported *\"TXT records differ between resolvers — likely GeoDNS or CDN steering. 2 resolvers returned 2 distinct answer sets.\"* (`status: SPLIT_HORIZON`) for **both** google.com and cloudflare.com, driving google.com's resolver score to 85.\n\n## Ground truth\n\nBoth resolvers return the **identical** TXT record set (29 records for cloudflare.com, 16 for google.com; sorted sets equal member-for-member). The o",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/811",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T12:21:37.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "DKIM 85 vs 0 for the same domain: assess_spoofability has a hole for exactly-one-selector-revoked (google.com)",
      "Excerpt": "For `google.com`, DKIM is scored **85/100** by `scan_domain` but **0/100** by `assess_spoofability` — same domain, same DNS, same run window. Ground truth: the only discoverable selector, `20230601`, is revoked (empty `p=`, verified).\n\nThis is not two scoring models by design — both tools call the same `checkDKIM` with the same 46-selector list (`packages/dns-checks/src/checks/dkim-selectors.ts:39-104`) and both receive the same `CheckResult`: score 85, `controlPresent: false`. The divergence is",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/808",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T12:09:53.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Injection-guard sanitizers mangle legitimate finding prose: underscores stripped from DNS labels, < and parens deleted (garbled SOA-expire text)",
      "Excerpt": "Two reported symptoms, one seam: stacked markdown-stripping sanitizers whose character classes have silently drifted apart.\n\n## The two transforms\n\n1. **`createFinding()` auto-sanitize** — `MARKDOWN_UNSAFE = /[`*#[\\]>|<]/g` at `packages/dns-checks/src/scoring/metadata-sanitize.ts:73`, applied to `detail`/`title` at construction (`scoring/model.ts:332,341`). **Mutates the Finding object**, so every surface (structuredContent, PDFs) sees the damage. Deliberately preserves `_` and `()` — the commen",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/807",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T12:09:51.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "http_security + ssl: a 204 No Content response is scored as a fully-measured page — confident false missing-header slate (google.com)",
      "Excerpt": "## Symptom (scanner validation sweep, 2026-08-28, dns-checks 1.25.0)\n\n`scan_domain google.com` emitted two false findings in one run:\n\n- http_security: *\"No X-Frame-Options header and no CSP frame-ancestors directive found\"* — false; every hop of google.com's chain (apex 301 and www 200, verified live with the scanner UA) carries `x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN`.\n- ssl: *\"No HTTP to HTTPS redirect (status 204)\"* — false; `http://google.com` returns `301 Location: http://www.google.com/`.\n\n```\n$ cur",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/806",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T12:09:49.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "check_dnssec: unconfirmed AD=true with no DS scores 100 \"cryptographically verified\" — non-deterministic false pass",
      "Excerpt": "`check_dnssec` awards **score 100** and the finding *\"DNSSEC enabled and validated — DNS responses are cryptographically verified\"* to domains with **no DS and no DNSKEY**, whenever the primary resolver's AD flag happens to come back `true` on that sample. Correct score is 60.\n\nFound while sweeping 16 AI-provider domains against production v3.66.0.\n\n## Evidence\n\n`moonshot.ai` — `check_dnssec` (force_refresh):\n\n```json\n{ \"category\": \"dnssec\", \"passed\": true, \"score\": 100,\n  \"controlPresent\": true",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/793",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-26T01:06:32.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Registry drift: registry behind live (3.65.0 < 3.66.0)",
      "Excerpt": "### MCP Registry is behind live production\n\n- Live `serverInfo.version` (dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com): `3.66.0`\n- Registry `?version=latest` (registry.modelcontextprotocol.io): `3.65.0`\n\n**Before republishing by hand, check whether `publish.yml` already ran for\n`v3.66.0` and is PARKED or FAILED:**\n\n1. `gh run list --workflow=publish.yml --repo MadaBurns/bv-mcp` - look for a run\n   against tag `v3.66.0`.\n2. If it is **waiting** on the `production` environment reviewer gate\n   (the `Publish to M",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues/792",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-26T00:06:36.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Contributor",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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