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  "Slug": "gaggiuino-mcp",
  "Name": "gaggiuino-mcp",
  "CanonicalUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/gaggiuino-mcp/issues",
  "ServerUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/gaggiuino-mcp",
  "IssueTotal": 88,
  "Held": 24,
  "Issues": [
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): make the consent token stateless so /oauth/authorize cannot be evicted",
      "Excerpt": "Found while writing the tests for #108/#109 (PR #118). Not a vulnerability that grants anything — it is an availability defect on the login path, and the fix removes a store rather than adding a guard.\n\n#### What is wrong\n\n`handleGet` in `apps/server/src/oauth/authorize.ts` calls `codes.remember(...)` to park the validated authorization request **before any authentication happens** — it has to, because the CSRF token in the form is the key to that parked request. `createCodeStore`'s `pending` ma",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/119",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-05T23:02:01.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "feat(server): zero-click Tailscale identity at /oauth/authorize",
      "Excerpt": "`/oauth/authorize` is the only endpoint a human's browser touches. On a tailnet, Tailscale already knows who that human is — so the owner passphrase (#109) could be skipped entirely, and the consent step would become physically uncompletable from the public internet. `tsidp` does exactly this: `server/authorize.go` refuses the route over Funnel with *\"they are not part of the tailnet that they are trying to be authenticated for.\"*\n\nThe mechanism is real. Verified in `tailscale/tailscale`, `ipn/i",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/115",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-05T12:01:48.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "chore(server): drop the MCP_AUTH_TOKEN startup tombstone",
      "Excerpt": "#111 kept `env.MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` read solely so a deployment that still sets it fails loudly at startup rather than silently serving an open `/mcp`. One release after 2.0.0, remove it:\n\n- the startup check and its `ConfigError`;\n- the `.env.example` tombstone line and its explanatory comment — `envExample.test.ts` enforces this direction too, so the code and the template must move in the same commit;\n- any remaining mention in README, SECURITY.md, AGENTS.md, `server.json`, `turbo.json`.\n\nNo behavi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/114",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-05T12:01:33.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "feat(server)!: remove MCP_AUTH_TOKEN in favour of OAuth",
      "Excerpt": "**This is the breaking change.** It lands only after OAuth works end to end against the owner's real connector on iOS (#113's probe is the gate). Nothing before this point removes anything.\n\n#### Why the token goes rather than staying alongside\n\nIt is a control the owner cannot configure, and one nobody on a personal plan can. Keeping it means two auth mechanisms, two sets of gate ordering to reason about, and a `writeToolDisabled` that answers a per-request question by reading the process envir",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/111",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-05T12:00:19.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "feat(server): delegate to an external issuer with MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER",
      "Excerpt": "The built-in AS (#108, #109) is the default because it keeps the one-container promise. It should not be the only path — plenty of self-hosters already run Authentik, Authelia, Keycloak, Zitadel or Kanidm, and a Tailscale user may prefer `tsidp`. This makes that a one-variable choice against code that already exists.\n\nAnthropic supports it with no extra ceremony: *\"A cross-host authorization server doesn't need anything special on its own. The `authorization_servers` field in your protected reso",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/110",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-05T11:59:38.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "feat(server): delete_profile tool, gated on explicit user confirmation",
      "Excerpt": "`upload_profile` (#101) gives the server a way to create a profile and no way to remove one. A model that uploads a malformed or duplicate profile leaves the user to clean it up on the machine's own screen, which is the surface the whole server exists to avoid.\n\n`DELETE /api/profile-select/{id}` is the endpoint. PR #104 deliberately left it on the not-called list (`client.ts`, \"endpoints this client does not call\") on the grounds that it was unverified and differs from the selector by HTTP metho",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/105",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-05T11:06:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "feat: adopt MCP spec 2026-07-28 via SDK v2 (`@modelcontextprotocol/server`), dual-era",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\nMCP spec [2026-07-28](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/changelog) shipped on July 28 ([announcement](https://blog.modelcontextprotocol.io/posts/2026-07-28/)). Anthropic says support is \"[rolling out across Claude products soon](https://claude.com/blog/bringing-mcp-2026-07-28-to-claude)\" — today's Claude clients still speak the 2025-era protocol, so there is no urgency, but once Claude's client update lands there are two concrete wins for this server:\n\n- **`ttlMs`/",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/165",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-12T21:11:00.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "epic: derived shot diagnostics",
      "Excerpt": "Batch from the 2026-08-08 assessment of [mxkissnr/gaggiuino-local-profiler](https://github.com/mxkissnr/gaggiuino-local-profiler) — a Home Assistant espresso profiler covering the same hardware, read in source for ideas that fit a stateless MCP server.\n\n## Why these belong together\n\nAll four are `apps/server/src/analysis.ts`, and they are the part of that project that transfers without a database: **pure functions over datapoints this server already fetches**. Nothing here needs a store, user-en",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/145",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-08T02:18:17.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "epic: loose-boundary tolerance",
      "Excerpt": "Batch 3 of the 2026-08-22 codebase improvement audit.\n\n## Why these belong together\n\nFour places where a malformed or hostile input takes down more than it should. The repo already has a posture here, stated in AGENTS.md: upstream payloads are validated at the client boundary with deliberately loose schemas so a firmware revision cannot take the server down, `maintenance.ts` routes uninterpretable keys to `extras` rather than failing, and expected failures are results rather than exceptions. The",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/200",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-23T02:20:01.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "epic: the /mcp gate and the OAuth path",
      "Excerpt": "Batch 1 of the 2026-08-22 codebase improvement audit.\n\n## Why these belong together\n\nThe first two are not adjacent issues, they are one edit. Both restructure the same block of `apps/server/src/http.ts` (`:203-239`):\n\n- #176 moves `authenticate` to run *after* `checkRequest`, restoring the ordering `mcpAuth.ts` documents and this file currently defeats.\n- #185 wraps the gate's rejection in `withCors` so an allowlisted browser origin can read the 401 challenge.\n\nThey also interact in a way neith",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/198",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-23T02:19:29.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "chore(repo): add a CONTRIBUTING pointer to the local verification gates",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\nDev commands live accurately in README §Development, but nothing onboards a contributor to the actual working loop: `check` vs `check:affected`, the coverage-ratchet rule (commit the raised numbers; never hand-edit `vitest.config.ts`), story screenshots for visual review, `fake-machine` for machineless development, and the fact that the squash-merged PR title is the only thing release-please reads.\n\n## Fix\n\nA thin CONTRIBUTING.md that points at the relevant AGENTS.md sections rather than",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/196",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:07:08.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "ci: pin the mcp-publisher binary by release checksum",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`publish-mcp.yml` downloads mcp-publisher from `releases/latest` unpinned (`curl | tar xz`), then hands that binary a GitHub OIDC token two steps later. Latest is a documented requirement — the registry rejects stale publisher binaries — but the download is currently unverified, an acknowledged supply-chain exposure directly on the publish path.\n\n## Fix\n\nKeep resolving latest at run time, but verify the tarball against the release's published checksum before execution (checksum fetched w",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/195",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:07:06.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "refactor(server): read GAGGIUINO_URL lazily so resetClient stays a full seam",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`MACHINE_URL` is read once at module load (`client.ts:979-980`: `process.env.GAGGIUINO_URL?.trim() || DEFAULT_MACHINE_URL`) and `getClient()` builds from that frozen constant (`client.ts:984-989`). `resetClient(config)` — the labelled test seam — can override every knob except baseUrl, so a test (or runtime config reload) changing the env after import observes nothing. The seam exists precisely to make config-dependent client behavior exercisable.\n\n## Fix\n\nRead the environment inside `ge",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/189",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:55.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "refactor(server): scope cache keys by HTTP method to remove the as-T cast",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`perform` returns cache hits via `hit as T` (`client.ts:699`) against a `createCache<unknown>`; soundness rests entirely on a docblock invariant that GET paths and write-ack paths never collide on a key. Nothing structural enforces it — a future cached GET on a path another verb touches would silently return the wrong payload type, and zod would catch it several layers away or not at all for loose schemas.\n\n## Fix\n\nKey cache entries by method as well as path (`${method}:${path}`), or sco",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/188",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:53.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "refactor(server): extract the shared target-series pairing used by events and analysis",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`events.ts:87-107` (`toSamples`) and `analysis.ts:131-148` (`meanDeviationFromTarget`) independently encode \"pair the measured and target series index-wise, treat commanded ≤ 0 as not-commanded, normalize via SCALE_BY_10\" — and already drift subtly: events drops instants where a reading is missing, analysis skips them mid-loop. Any future change to that convention must be made twice and can silently disagree.\n\n## Fix\n\nExtract `pairedSamples(measured, target, fieldName)` into `normalize.t",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/187",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:51.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "refactor: give the x10 wire scaling one home shared by server and shot-graph",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\nTwo ×10-scaling homes exist and have diverged:\n\n- `apps/server/src/normalize.ts` `SCALE_BY_10` covers pressure, targetPressure, temperature, targetTemperature, pumpFlow, weightFlow, targetPumpFlow, shotWeight, waterPumped, timeInShot;\n- `packages/shot-graph/src/normalize.ts` hand-divides only the seven charted fields plus inline duration/timeInShot handling.\n\nIf a firmware-scaled field ever reaches the chart or the CSV export (`targetTemperature` and `waterPumped` are live candidates), s",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/186",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:50.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): send CORS headers on early rejections for allowlisted origins",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\nCORS headers decorate only responses that come back through `handleMcp`. The\n401 refusal from the security gate is returned bare at `http.ts:233`, outside\nthe `withCors(...)` wrap at `http.ts:236-239`, so a browser-based client on an\nallowlisted origin gets no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` on the challenge and\ncannot read `WWW-Authenticate` from JavaScript. Header reflection itself is\ncorrect (`mcpAuth.ts:301-324`: origin echoed, never `*`, `Vary: Origin`,\nexpose-headers covers the sessi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/185",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:48.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): bind refresh-token audience to the granted resource parameter",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\nThe authorization-code grant seals the refresh token's audience from the caller-supplied `resource` parameter via `audienceFor()` (`oauth/token.ts:345-355`), but `handleRefresh` verifies the presented refresh token against `deps.config.resource` only (`oauth/tokens.ts:244-260`). A grant issued with a non-default `resource` yields access tokens that authenticate fine while their refresh token is refused as `invalid_grant` — such deployments loop through re-consent every access-token lifet",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/184",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:46.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): negative-cache failed CIMD client-document resolutions",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`resolveClient` caches only successful CIMD document fetches (`oauth/clients.ts:180-215`; the cache fill sits behind the success branch), so failed or rejected resolutions re-fetch on every request. An anonymous flood of `GET /oauth/authorize` carrying distinct public-https `client_id`s therefore drives one outbound fetch each (3s timeout, 64KB cap) at arbitrary public hosts — an unmetered outbound-fetch sink on an unauthenticated path. The DNS TOCTOU residue is documented and accepted; ",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/183",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:44.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): derive the scope gate fail-closed when readOnlyHint is absent",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`protectedToolsIn` selects tools with `readOnlyHint === false` (`oauth/scopeGate.ts:29-33`), so a future write tool whose annotations omit `readOnlyHint` entirely (undefined) is *not* scope-gated: the runtime derivation falls open where this repo otherwise fails closed. Currently mitigated — `defineTool` requires annotations and `scopeGate.test.ts` pins `PROTECTED_TOOLS` to exactly the three writes, so an accidental loss fails CI — but the derivation direction is wrong for any future too",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/182",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:42.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): answer unknown tools with JSON-RPC -32602 instead of an isError result",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`handleToolCall` throws `Error(\"Unknown tool: …\")` for an unrecognized name and `callTool`'s catch-all wraps it as `{ isError: true, … }` over HTTP 200. The MCP spec directs servers to answer `tools/call` for an unknown name with Invalid params (-32602); today a host cannot distinguish a mistyped tool name from a server bug, and the caller's mistake logs at error level as though it were ours. An output-schema `.parse()` violation falls into the same generic channel instead of the typed I",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/181",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:41.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(mcp-app): validate tool-result JSON at readToolJson and stop NaN or raw TypeErrors reaching the UI",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`readToolJson` does `JSON.parse(text) as T` with no runtime validation (`packages/ui/src/host/toolResult.ts`), and the shot-graph app trusts the result structurally:\n\n- missing `duration` → `shot.duration / SCALE` is NaN → ShotHeader renders \"NaN g in NaN s\";\n- missing `profile` object → `shot.profile.name` throws TypeError inside render, putting a raw JS message in front of the user — contradicting the shell rule that users see server-authored errors, never invented ones;\n- string-numbe",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/180",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:38.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): tolerate a malformed element in /api/profiles/all instead of failing the whole list",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`MachineProfilesSchema` accepts `/api/profiles/all` as an array of elements each requiring a string `name` (`client.ts:273-278`, element schema ~L218-224). One malformed element — a firmware revision omitting `name`, or a truncated body — fails the whole array parse: `MalformedUpstreamError`, `list_profiles` errors out entirely, and `profileCatalog.ts` degrades to documentation-only, hiding every real profile because of one bad record.\n\nThat sits badly next to this repo's own loose-bound",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/179",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:36.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "fix(server): substitute guidance placeholders with replacer functions",
      "Excerpt": "## Why\n\n`renderDialInGuidance` substitutes placeholders with two-argument `String.replace` (`guidance.ts:24-25`):\n\n```\n.replace(\"{user_context}\", prompt.userContext ?? \"\")\n.replace(\"{profiles_text}\", getAllProfilesText())\n```\n\nIn JS the replacement *string* interpolates `$&`, `` $` `` and `$'` sequences, so a `user_context` in `prompts.local.yaml` containing e.g. a bare `$&` corrupts the rendered guidance; profile text flowing through `getAllProfilesText()` has the same power. Both surfaces inhe",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp/issues/178",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-22T08:06:35.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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