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  "Slug": "gam-seller-mcp-node",
  "Name": "gam-seller-mcp-node",
  "CanonicalUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues",
  "ServerUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/gam-seller-mcp-node",
  "IssueTotal": 19,
  "Held": 16,
  "Issues": [
    {
      "Title": "README security section should state the hash-chain attribution boundary (ADR-4)",
      "Excerpt": "`hashEntry` covers `{ seq, event_class, payload, prev_hash, timestamp }` (`src/audit/event.ts:54`) and **deliberately excludes** the top-level `buyer_id` / `request_id` (ADR-4 decision B, `event.ts:43-45`). This is a sound tradeoff — it lets crypto-shred (Art. 17) anonymize entries without breaking the chain — but the README's *\"every decision audited / hash-chained\"* reads as if attribution is tamper-evident. Reattribution of an entry's top-level actor is not covered by the chain (the pseudonym",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/68",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-10T08:10:48.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add JSDoc to public-facing types in catalog/store.ts and pricing/store.ts",
      "Excerpt": "## What to do\n\nAdd JSDoc comments to the exported interfaces and types that buyer agents and publisher operators interact with:\n\n- \\`ProductFamily\\` in \\`src/catalog/store.ts\\`\n- \\`FamilyPrice\\` in \\`src/pricing/store.ts\\`\n- \\`ForecastBucket\\` in \\`src/forecast/engine.ts\\`\n- \\`DeploymentConfig\\` in \\`src/config/deployment.ts\\`\n\n## Example\n\n```typescript\n/** A coarse product family visible to an entitled buyer agent.\n *  Raw inventory IDs, deal IDs, and exact floor prices are never included.\n */\n",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/10",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-22T08:06:52.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "RFC: Bucket thresholds — define what Low / Mid / High means in impression terms",
      "Excerpt": "## Background\n\n\\`get_forecast\\` returns one of three buckets: \\`low\\`, \\`mid\\`, \\`high\\`. The current implementation is synthetic and deterministic. When the real GAM ForecastService adapter lands (#4), the engine will need to map actual impression forecasts to these three values.\n\nThe thresholds are not yet defined. This issue is the place to discuss and ratify them.\n\n## Questions\n\n**Absolute vs relative thresholds?**\n- Absolute: \\`low < 100k impressions\\`, \\`mid = 100k–1M\\`, \\`high > 1M\\`\n- Re",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/12",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-22T08:08:23.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Production transport: TLS termination, bind posture, and single-instance limitation",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe HTTP transport binds loopback and expects a reverse proxy to terminate TLS; there is no in-process TLS. And the rate limiter, replay guard, and intent store are in-memory per process, so the node is **single-instance** — scaling out would split that state.\n\n**Anchor:** `docs/PUBLISHER-DEPLOYMENT.md` (reverse-proxy + single-instance notes) and `src/http.ts` (bind).\n\n## Impact\n\nA publisher deploying without a correctly configured TLS-terminating proxy exposes plaintext; a publisher",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/86",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-18T23:22:30.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Head-hash anchor is a local rewritable file — move to external WORM / Object Lock for production",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe tamper-evidence guarantee assumes the head-hash anchor lives in an **append-only external** store. Today it is written to a local file with a rewritable `writeFileSync`.\n\n**Anchor:** `src/audit/anchor.ts` — the code comment itself notes: *\"Production: use cloud-immutable write instead (never overwrite).\"*\n\n## Impact\n\nAn adversary who can rewrite the local ledger can also rewrite the local anchor alongside it, defeating the \"tamper with the local file alone isn't enough\" property.",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/85",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-18T23:22:28.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Audit event taxonomy: 9 of 16 EventClasses are emitted; 7 are defined-but-unused",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`src/audit/event.ts` defines **16** `EventClass` values, but only **9** are ever emitted via `ledger.append(...)`.\n\n**Emitted (9):** `BUYER_AUTHENTICATION`, `SCOPE_RESOLUTION`, `FORECAST_REQUEST`, `INTENT_CREATED`, `INTENT_EXPIRED`, `INTENT_REVOKED`, `TOKEN_ISSUANCE`, `TOKEN_REVOCATION`, `ANCHORING`.\n\n**Defined but never emitted (7):** `FORECAST_CACHE_FILL`, `SOFT_LOCK_SET`, `SOFT_LOCK_EXPIRED`, `SOFT_LOCK_REVOKED`, `OPERATOR_GATE_APPROVAL`, `OPERATOR_GATE_REJECTION`, `RESTORE`.\n\n## ",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/84",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-18T23:22:26.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "DSR overlay retains the raw buyer_id after an Art. 17 erasure (P3 residual)",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nTo make an erasure durable (so a config redeploy can't silently re-expose an erased buyer), the DSR overlay persists the buyer in `data/dsr-state.json`. But it stores the **raw** `buyer_id` in `suppressed[]` / `restricted[]`.\n\n**Anchor:** `src/policy/dsr-state.ts` — `DsrState = { suppressed: string[]; restricted: string[] }`, populated with raw buyer ids.\n\nSo after `DsrToolkit.suppressBuyer()` crypto-shreds the pseudonym key and purges `intents.json`, the raw identifier still survive",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/83",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-18T23:22:24.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "client_request_id is optional → a request can bypass SEC-GATE-3 (replay detection)",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nReplay detection (SEC-GATE-3) only runs when the caller supplies `client_request_id`. A request that omits it skips the dedup step entirely — the replay guard is never consulted.\n\n**Anchor:** `src/server.ts` — every tool handler guards replay behind `if (client_request_id !== undefined) { … replayGuard.isReplay(...) … }`. No field → no check.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker replaying a captured authenticated request without `client_request_id` is not caught by SEC-GATE-3 (it still faces auth",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/82",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-18T23:22:22.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "issue-buyer-token.ts leaves an un-anchored ledger → server fail-closes on next startup (no_anchor_but_non_empty_ledger)",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\nMinting a buyer token with the documented CLI (`scripts/issue-buyer-token.ts`) on a fresh state writes a `TOKEN_ISSUANCE` event to the persistent audit ledger but never anchors the head. The **next server startup then aborts fail-closed**:\n\n```\nFatal: [audit] FATAL: ledger integrity check failed on startup (no_anchor_but_non_empty_ledger) — refusing to serve requests with a suspect chain. Investigate the ledger and anchor before restarting.\n```\n\nSo the node won't start after followin",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/73",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-12T11:48:57.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add a structural test that every authenticated tool routes through policy (scope gate)",
      "Excerpt": "`resolveScope()` (the policy/allowlist gate) is invoked **manually inside each authenticated handler** (`src/server.ts:228, 290, 354, 442`), not enforced by the tool-registration path. The README states *\"Adding a new tool in the future cannot bypass this\"* (`README.md:218`), but there is no wrapper and no test that enforces it: a new `server.tool(...)` that omits the `authenticate` / `resolveScope` calls would bypass policy silently.\n\nAll 5 current surfaces are correctly gated — `well_known_cap",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/67",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-10T08:10:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Persistence-health surfacing (v0.6 E1) only covers the ledger; extend to the other 4 stores + /health",
      "Excerpt": "**Tier:** 1–2 (integrity / observability)\n\n**Use case**\nv0.6 added a persistence-health flag to `AuditLedger` (`isPersistenceHealthy()`, `src/audit/ledger.ts`) and surfaced it through `GET /health` (v0.8, `status:\"degraded\"`). But the other four disk-backed stores still **swallow write failures** as a benign `WARNING`:\n\n- `src/audit/pseudonym.ts`\n- `src/audit/anchor.ts`\n- `src/audit/retention.ts`\n- `src/identity/denylist.ts`\n\n(all matched by `grep -rn \"could not persist\" src/`).\n\n**Why it matter",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/51",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-30T10:00:24.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Intent store is in-memory only: committed intents are lost on restart",
      "Excerpt": "**Tier:** 1 (durability of a core surface)\n\n**Describe the bug**\n`IntentStore` holds intents in a plain in-memory `Map` with no persistence (`src/intent/store.ts:45` — `private readonly byId = new Map(...)`, no `persistPath`), unlike the ledger (`src/audit/ledger.ts`) and denylist (`src/identity/denylist.ts`) which are file-backed. So a node restart drops all live intents.\n\nThis was acceptable in v0.5 (create-only, no read/revoke surface). It stopped being acceptable in **v0.7**, which added `re",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/50",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-30T10:00:08.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add integration test: pricing_options absent when valid_until has expired",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\n\\`PricingStore.priceFor()\\` returns \\`undefined\\` for expired prices (fail-closed). This is unit-tested in \\`tests/pricing.test.ts\\`. However, the end-to-end buyer-agent session test (\\`tests/buyer-agent-session.test.ts\\`) only covers the happy path (valid price → \\`pricing_options\\` present).\n\n## What to add\n\nA new \\`it()\\` block in \\`tests/buyer-agent-session.test.ts\\` or \\`tests/server.test.ts\\` that:\n\n1. Builds a server with a \\`PricingStore\\` configured with an **already-expired",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/11",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-22T08:08:08.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "OpenRTB 3.0 product taxonomy: align family_id scheme with IAB standards",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\nCurrently, \\`family_id\\` values are publisher-defined free-form strings (\\`\"display-ros\"\\`, \\`\"video-pre-roll\"\\`). A buyer agent connecting to multiple seller nodes has no way to know that \\`\"display-ros\"\\` at Publisher A is the same product type as \\`\"display-banner\"\\` at Publisher B.\n\nAligning \\`family_id\\` with the [OpenRTB 3.0](https://iabtechlab.com/standards/openrtb/) / [AdCOM](https://iabtechlab.com/standards/adcom/) taxonomy would make family IDs interoperable across publishe",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/9",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-22T08:06:40.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Prometheus metrics endpoint: observability for production deployments",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\nIn a production deployment, operators need to monitor:\n- Request rates per buyer and per tool\n- Auth failure rates (spike = probing or misconfigured buyer)\n- Rate-limit hit frequency\n- Audit ledger size and last anchor time\n- Forecast bucket distribution (to detect synthetic vs real data divergence)\n\nCurrently, none of this is observable without reading the audit ledger files directly.\n\n## Proposed endpoint\n\nA scrape-friendly Prometheus metrics endpoint at \\`/metrics\\` (not exposed t",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/8",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-22T08:06:24.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "OIDC buyer authentication: replace manual entitlements.json with federated identity",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\nCurrently, buyer entitlements are granted by editing \\`config/entitlements.json\\` manually and restarting the node. This is fine for a pilot with 1-2 buyers, but it doesn't scale to a publisher managing dozens of buyer organizations.\n\n## Proposed solution\n\nSupport OIDC/JWT bearer tokens issued by a trusted Identity Provider (IdP) — e.g. Auth0, Okta, or a publisher-operated IdP. The \\`entitlements.json\\` config would define which OIDC issuers and claims map to which surfaces and scope",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/7",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-22T08:06:09.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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