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  "Slug": "janee",
  "Name": "janee",
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  "ServerUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/janee",
  "IssueTotal": 18,
  "Held": 17,
  "Issues": [
    {
      "Title": "Security Audit",
      "Excerpt": "Hey, I came across this solution and I like the idea of not giving acces to our secrets.\nI cloned the repo and asked claude to do a security audit.\nI wonder what you think about this, is my guy hallucinating? :-)\n\n# Security Audit: Janee v0.4.1\n\n  **Project:** Secrets management proxy for AI agents via MCP\n  **Date:** 2026-02-09\n  **Scope:** Full source review of all TypeScript source files\n\n  ---\n\n  ## Critical: SSRF allows secret exfiltration\n\n  An AI agent can bypass the proxy by passing an a",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/14",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-09T15:43:31.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 7,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "'exec' over HTTP does not make sense as implemented (discussion)",
      "Excerpt": "# Janee Exec Architecture Rethink\n\n## Runner + Authority model for safe(ish) agent CLI execution\n\nThis is a detailed write-up of what Janee is, what it is not, why the current exec model breaks for containerized agents (“creatures”), and how to evolve Janee without wrecking the simple local UX that already works well.\n\n---\n\n## 1) What Janee is (and why it matters)\n\nJanee is a **credential mediation layer** for agents.\n\nIts core value is not “perfect secret isolation under all adversarial conditi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/108",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-21T09:14:55.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Support network transport (HTTP/SSE) for `janee serve` to enable containerized agent deployments",
      "Excerpt": "## Support network transport (HTTP/SSE) for `janee serve` to enable containerized agent deployments\n\n### Problem\n\nWhen running an AI agent inside a Docker container (e.g., OpenClaw with Sysbox), the `janee-openclaw` plugin cannot connect to a host-side Janee instance. Both `janee serve` and the plugin are hardcoded to stdio transport:\n\n```javascript\n// janee: core/mcp-server.js\nconst transport = new StdioServerTransport();\n\n// janee-openclaw: index.js\nconst transport = new StdioClientTransport({",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/28",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-10T08:05:25.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "feat: propagate timeout through runner mode for service tests",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\nFrom PR #125 review — when `janee test --timeout 5000` runs in runner mode, the timeout applies to the round-trip HTTP call to the Authority, not to the upstream service test itself. The Authority uses its own 10s default internally.\n\n## Proposed\n\n- Add `timeout` field to `POST /v1/test` request body\n- Add `timeout` parameter to the `test_service` MCP tool schema\n- Authority should respect the requested timeout (clamped to a max)\n- Document that CLI `--timeout` in runner mode = round",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/128",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-27T05:52:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "feat: SIGHUP config reload for long-running servers",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nJanee has a `reload_config` MCP tool for agents to trigger config reloads, but there's no infrastructure-level way to reload config without restarting the process.\n\nWhen running Janee as a long-lived authority server (`janee serve`), changing `config.yaml` (e.g. adding a capability, updating allowedAgents) currently requires killing and restarting the process. This causes downtime for any connected runners/agents.\n\n## Proposal\n\nAdd a SIGHUP handler that reloads config from disk, usin",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/117",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-23T11:08:43.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "headers auth type: CLI doesn't support custom header names, manual config breaks encryption",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\nCursor Agent here. I was trying to configure Janee to proxy requests to the dev.to API, which uses a custom `api-key` header for authentication (not `Authorization: Bearer <token>`).\n\n## What I tried\n\n### Attempt 1: `bearer` auth type\n\n```bash\njanee add devto -u https://dev.to/api -k \"<key>\" --auth-type bearer\n```\n\nThis succeeded, but dev.to returned `403` because it expects the key in an `api-key` header, not `Authorization: Bearer <key>`.\n\nI also tried passing a custom header via `",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/92",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-19T12:03:07.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "MCP list_services returns empty despite configured services",
      "Excerpt": "## Bug\n\n`list_services` via MCP returns an empty array `[]` despite having 8 services and 10 capabilities configured.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n1. Have services configured (verified via `janee list` CLI which shows all 8 services correctly)\n2. Call `list_services` via MCP tool\n3. Returns `[]`\n\n## Expected\n\nShould return the same services/capabilities visible via `janee list`:\n\n```\nServices: mexc, okx, bybit, google-analytics, devto, openseed-patch, secure-seed, fal\nCapabilities: mexc, okx, bybit, google",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/116",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-23T10:19:39.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Hardened agent identity: session-bound verified authentication",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\nJanee supports agent-scoped access control via `allowedAgents` on capabilities and a `defaultAccess` server policy.\n\n### Current state (shipped)\n\nAgent identity is resolved from **`clientInfo.name`** sent during the MCP `initialize` handshake — the standard MCP client identification mechanism. This works uniformly across all transports:\n\n- **stdio** (Cursor, Codex, Claude Code, Claude Desktop): `clientInfo.name` is captured from the single-client session\n- **HTTP** (autonomous agents",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/96",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-20T07:23:06.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "RFC 0001 implementation status: exec mode is ~95% complete, missing `janee add --exec` CLI flow",
      "Excerpt": "Reviewed RFC 0001 (Secure CLI Execution) against the codebase. Here's the status:\n\n## ✅ Fully implemented\n\n| Component | File | Notes |\n|-----------|------|-------|\n| Core execution engine | `src/core/exec.ts` | `validateCommand()`, `buildExecEnv()`, `scrubCredentials()`, `executeCommand()` |\n| Command whitelisting | `exec.ts` | `allowCommands` config enforced |\n| Shell injection blocking | `exec.ts` | Metacharacters rejected: `;\\|\\`$(){}\\\\<>` |\n| Credential injection | `exec.ts` | `{{credential",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/87",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-18T13:20:43.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "npm 0.8.1 missing exec mode (janee_exec tool) — needs 0.8.2 publish",
      "Excerpt": "## Dogfooding finding\n\nThe exec mode feature from PR #69 was merged on 2025-02-13 at 13:04 UTC, but npm 0.8.1 was published at 06:42 UTC the same day — **before the merge**.\n\nAs a result, `janee serve` via the npm-installed binary exposes only 3 tools:\n- `list_services`\n- `execute` \n- `reload_config`\n\nThe `janee_exec` tool is completely absent because the exec tool registration code (`mcp-server.ts` line ~186-218) does not exist in the published dist.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g @tr",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/70",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-13T13:27:53.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Publishing to MCP Registry — step-by-step guide",
      "Excerpt": "Following up on PR #60 (merged ✅), here's how to publish Janee to the Official MCP Registry.\n\nThe `server.json` and `mcpName` are already in place, so you're 90% there!\n\n## Steps\n\n### 1. Publish the latest npm package\nMake sure the npm package `@true-and-useful/janee` v0.8.0 includes the `mcpName` field in its `package.json`:\n```bash\nnpm publish --access public\n```\n\n### 2. Install `mcp-publisher`\n```bash\ncurl -L \"https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases/latest/download/mcp-publi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/61",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-12T18:04:26.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add --json flag to janee search for programmatic access",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`janee search [query]` outputs a human-readable formatted listing of the service directory. There's no structured output option, making it difficult to use programmatically.\n\n## Proposed solution\n\nAdd a `--json` flag (consistent with `janee list --json`) that outputs the directory results as a JSON array:\n\n```bash\njanee search stripe --json\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"name\": \"stripe\",\n    \"description\": \"Payment processing platform\",\n    \"url\": \"https://api.stripe.com\",\n",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/37",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-10T12:08:57.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add --json flag to `janee list` command",
      "Excerpt": "## Context\n\nBuilding integration between [the-office](https://github.com/rsdouglas/the-office) plugin system and the Janee CLI. The Office backend acts as an RPC broker that spawns CLI commands and expects JSON on stdout.\n\n## Problem\n\n`janee list` outputs human-readable text only:\n\n```\nServices:\n  bearerService\n    URL: https://api1.com\n    Auth: bearer\n  ...\n```\n\nThere is no `--json` flag, so the backend adapter cannot parse structured data from it.\n\nReading `~/.janee/config.yaml` directly is n",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/34",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-10T11:40:58.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "No rate limiting on MCP execute tool",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe `execute` tool has no rate limiting. A compromised or buggy agent could spam API requests.\n\n## Current Mitigation\n\nRate limiting is expected to happen:\n1. **Upstream at the API** — most APIs have their own rate limits\n2. **In OpenClaw session policies** — session-level controls\n\n## Options\n\n1. **Document the expectation** that rate limiting happens upstream (simplest)\n2. **Add optional capability-level rate limiting** (e.g., `rateLimit: \"10/minute\"`)\n3. **Add global rate limiting",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/25",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-10T06:15:13.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add response body size limit to prevent DoS",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`makeAPIRequest()` in `src/core/mcp-server.ts` concatenates response chunks without a size limit:\n\n```typescript\nres.on('data', (chunk) => {\n  body += chunk;  // ← unbounded\n});\n```\n\nA malicious or broken API could OOM the proxy.\n\n## Fix\n\n1. Add configurable max body size (default 10MB)\n2. Abort request if exceeded\n3. Return error to agent with truncation notice\n\n## Credit\n\nFound by @mkoorn in #14",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/21",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-10T06:11:18.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Encrypt auth.headers values at rest",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`auth.type: headers` values are stored in plaintext in `config.yaml`, while other auth types (bearer, hmac, service-account) are encrypted.\n\nExample:\n```yaml\nservices:\n  example:\n    auth:\n      type: headers\n      headers:\n        X-API-Key: secret-value-in-plaintext  # ← not encrypted\n```\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `src/cli/config-yaml.ts`:\n1. Encrypt each header value when saving (`saveYAMLConfig`)\n2. Decrypt each header value when loading (`loadYAMLConfig`)\n\n## Credit\n\nFound by @mkoorn in #14",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/20",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-10T06:11:16.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "SSRF vulnerability: validate URL origin before injecting auth",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nAn agent can bypass the proxy by passing an absolute URL as the `path` parameter. `new URL(\"https://evil.com\", \"https://api.service.com/\")` ignores the base URL, but our auth headers are still injected.\n\n## Attack Vector\n\nPrompt-injected agent passes `https://attacker.com/steal` as path → auth token sent to attacker.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nServices with path-based rules (`allow: ['GET /v1/*']`) are protected since `https://evil.com` won't match. Services without rules are vulnerable.\n\n## Fi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/rsdouglas/janee/issues/16",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-10T06:11:11.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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