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{
"Title": "On-Chain Market Intelligence Co-Pilot with 4× Faster Insights",
"Excerpt": "Source: https://panteracapital.com/blockchain-letter/navigating-crypto-in-2026/\n\n## Innovation\nPantera highlights consumer AI platforms like Surf.ai delivering \"on-chain-backed market insights 4× faster\" than alternatives. AI as crypto co-pilot for real-time blockchain analytics.\n\n## 100× Supercharge: MCP On-Chain Intelligence Agent\n\n```python\nfrom dataclasses import dataclass\nfrom typing import Literal\nimport asyncio\n\n@dataclass\nclass MarketInsight:\n \"\"\"On-chain derived market insight.\"\"\"\n ",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/38",
"PublishedAt": "2026-02-02T12:07:39.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 5,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "top",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "[BUG] gateway.yaml: permission 0600 causes infinite restart loop with misleading error + state-file data loss",
"Excerpt": "# gateway.yaml permission 0600 causes infinite restart loop with misleading error\n\n**Version**: mcp-gateway 3.4.0 (ghcr.io/mikkoparkkola/mcp-gateway:latest)\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen the mounted `gateway.yaml` is not readable by the in-container user, the gateway enters an **infinite restart loop** and logs a misleading error that gives no hint about the actual cause.\n\n## Environment\n\n- Container: `ghcr.io/mikkoparkkola/mcp-gateway:latest` (3.4.0)\n- Started with read-only bind mount of config:\n ```\n -",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/437",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-21T09:15:35.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 4,
"Reporter": "External",
"Rank": "top",
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{
"Title": "[FEATURE] support setting client host, client port and client secret for Oauth flows",
"Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nSlack and Figma have specific needs: Figma requires the host to be \"localhost\" instead of ip address, Slack requires a specific port and a specific callback path.\n\n## Proposed Solution\n\nProvide fields that can be filled in the yaml file, and fallback to defaults if there is none. \n\n## Alternatives Considered\n\n\n## Additional Context\n\nI ",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/140",
"PublishedAt": "2026-04-20T13:29:21.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 3,
"Reporter": "External",
"Rank": "top",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "security: migrate JWT from RS256 to PQC-safe algorithm + enforce TLS 1.3 minimum",
"Excerpt": "## Summary\n\nTwo PQC gaps:\n\n### 1. JWT uses RS256 (RSA-2048)\nRSA-2048 broken by Shor's algorithm. Migration: short-term switch internal tokens to HS256 (HMAC-SHA256, already PQC-safe). Medium-term adopt ML-DSA when available in Rust. aws_lc_rs backend already used (good).\n\n### 2. TLS 1.2 still allowed\nEnforce TLS 1.3 minimum. Track rustls PQC cipher suite support (ML-KEM/Kyber) for adoption when available.\n\n## Acceptance Criteria\n\n- [ ] Internal JWT tokens use HS256 where asymmetric not required\n",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/116",
"PublishedAt": "2026-04-11T20:16:46.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 3,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "top",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "MCP security audit: tool poisoning, gateway bypass, scope collision (Doyensec research)",
"Excerpt": "## Source\n\n[Doyensec — The MCP AuthN/Z Nightmare](https://blog.doyensec.com/2026/03/05/mcp-nightmare.html) | Sponsored by Teleport\n\n## Problem\n\nDoyensec's MCP security research explicitly identifies **MCP Proxies/Gateways** as an attack surface:\n\n> \"MCP Proxies/Gateways: Intermediary systems (like MCP proxies) used for routing and authorization of MCP. These could alter passing MCP messages or simply be vulnerable to policy bypasses.\"\n\nmcp-gateway is a meta-MCP proxy routing 178+ tools across mu",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/100",
"PublishedAt": "2026-03-11T14:07:32.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 3,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "top",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "Add Gemini Embedding 2 multimodal embedding capability",
"Excerpt": "## Context\n\nGoogle released [Gemini Embedding 2 Preview](https://ai.google.dev/gemini-api/docs/embeddings) (`gemini-embedding-2-preview`) — the first multimodal embedding model in the Gemini API. It maps text, images, video, audio, and documents into a unified embedding space.\n\n**Source**: https://ai.google.dev/gemini-api/docs/embeddings (via Google Developer notification)\n\n### Key features\n\n- **Multimodal**: text + images + video + audio + documents in one embedding space\n- **Cross-modal search",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/97",
"PublishedAt": "2026-03-11T12:39:22.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 3,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "top",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "Add OpenPencil capability: 90 MCP tools for design file operations",
"Excerpt": "## Context\n\n[OpenPencil](https://github.com/open-pencil/open-pencil) is an open-source design editor with a 90-tool MCP server for reading, writing, querying, and exporting Figma `.fig` files. It supports both stdio and HTTP transports.\n\n**Source**: https://github.com/open-pencil/open-pencil\n\n### Tool Categories (90 tools)\n\n- **File management** (3): open, create, save .fig files\n- **Node operations** (~30): create shapes, frames, text; set fills, strokes, effects; manage auto-layout\n- **Compone",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/95",
"PublishedAt": "2026-03-11T11:11:29.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 3,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "top",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "Safe Code Execution MCP Server",
"Excerpt": "## Overview\nContainerized Python/JavaScript runtime for safe code execution - a core gateway capability for AI agents that need to run untrusted code.\n\n## Why This Matters\nAI agents frequently need to:\n- Execute user-provided code snippets\n- Run generated code for validation\n- Process data transformations\n- Test implementations before deployment\n\nWithout sandboxing, this is a critical security risk.\n\n## Proposed Implementation\n\n### Sandboxed Execution Service\n```python\nclass SafeCodeExecutor:\n ",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/49",
"PublishedAt": "2026-02-02T12:23:37.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 3,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "top",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "Reload refusal message can state that nothing was applied, once env files stop being applied early",
"Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe network-posture refusal message at `src/config_reload/mod.rs:1478-1482` deliberately\nstates two bounded facts and no summary of what is still in force. The comment above it\n(`:1483-1492`) says why: `Config::load` applies the candidate's `env_files` to the process\nenvironment before returning, so at the moment the refusal is computed the environment has\nalready been mutated, and a later capability call can resolve an `env:` credential to a\nvalue the refused file supplied. The mess",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/463",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-29T14:06:37.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "An unparseable config is replaced with defaults, then written back to disk",
"Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`load_config_or_default` turns any `Config::load` failure into `Config::default()` after a\nwarn-level log (`src/config_persistence.rs:13-22`). One of its callers is the admin-UI\nread-modify-write path, which then writes the result straight back to disk:\n\n```rust\nlet mut config = crate::config_persistence::load_config_or_default(path); // :1405\nlet value = match mutate(&mut config) { ... };\ncrate::config_persistence::write_config(path, &config)?; // :1410\n```\n\n(`s",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/462",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-29T14:06:13.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "Config watcher misses a symlink retargeted across directories",
"Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe config watcher resolves a symlinked config path per event, so a retarget within an\nalready-watched directory is picked up. A retarget to a file in a directory that was not\nwatched at startup is not: `notify` watches are added once, before the event loop starts\n(`src/config_reload/mod.rs:1066-1085`), and the callback cannot add more.\n\nResult: after such a retarget, writes to the new target produce no reload and the gateway\nkeeps serving the previous configuration, silently.\n\nThis ",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/453",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T16:00:56.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "DELETE /mcp terminates a session without checking the caller owns it",
"Excerpt": "Reported by an independent review of PR #450 and confirmed at source. Out of scope for that PR: the handler is untouched by it.\n\n**Problem.** `DELETE /mcp` at `src/gateway/router/handlers.rs:249` removes the session named by the `mcp-session-id` header without resolving the caller principal, so it never applies the owner binding that `GET` and `POST` enforce via `session_owner` (`src/gateway/router/handlers.rs:135`). A caller who knows another session's id can terminate that session's stream.\n\nS",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/452",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T15:38:03.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "Pending sampling responses are resolved without checking session ownership",
"Excerpt": "Reported by an independent review of PR #450 and confirmed at source. Out of scope for that PR: the lines are untouched by it (`git diff origin/main...HEAD` covers no hunk at this location).\n\n**Problem.** `resolve_pending` in `src/gateway/router/handlers.rs:487` routes a sampling/elicitation response purely by request id. The pending map (`src/gateway/proxy.rs:74`) stores no owner, so any session that learns a prompt id can answer another session's prompt — including a destructive-action confirm",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/451",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T15:35:59.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "[FEATURE] Allow operators to trim the exposed gateway_* meta-tool surface (reduce AI distraction)",
"Excerpt": "### Summary\n\nWhen `mcp-gateway` is used as the backend in front of an AI agent (OpenClaw / Claude / Gemini, etc.), **every authenticated client sees all 17 `gateway_*` meta-tools in `tools/list`, regardless of role or actual need.** Most deployments only need a small subset; the rest (stats, cost report, playbook, kill/revive server, profile management, reload, set_state, etc.) are either irrelevant or outright dangerous to expose to a general-purpose agent.\n\nA bloated tool surface measurably hu",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/449",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-25T07:08:30.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "External",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "surfaced_tools is parsed and then ignored: config accepted, tools never appear in tools/list",
"Excerpt": "## Summary\n\n`meta_mcp.surfaced_tools` is accepted by the config loader and has no effect at runtime on build `3.4.0-f30539af`. The tool never appears in `tools/list`, and nothing is logged at any level to say why.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```yaml\nmeta_mcp:\n warm_start:\n - vault-operator\n surfaced_tools:\n - server: vault-operator\n tool: search_vault\n```\n\n```\ninitialize -> 200\ntools/list -> [\"gateway_search\", \"gateway_execute\"]\n```\n\nExpected `search_vault` alongside the meta-tools.\n\n## Why i",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/440",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-23T14:14:35.000Z",
"State": "open",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "Transport errors are flattened into a string, so callers cannot tell permanent from transient",
"Excerpt": "**Problem**: the stdio transport maps every spawn failure to `Error::Transport(format!(\"Failed to spawn: {e}\"))`. The `io::ErrorKind` is destroyed at that boundary, so a mistyped command path (NotFound) and a non-executable binary (PermissionDenied) are indistinguishable from a port that is not listening yet.\n\nWarm-start (#424) retries while a backend's tool cache is empty, so a typo in a backend command produces a respawn attempt once a minute for the process lifetime, with nothing saying the c",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/425",
"PublishedAt": "2026-08-16T14:32:04.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 0,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "Concurrent config reloads can orphan a started backend",
"Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`BackendRegistry::register` uses `DashMap::insert`, which silently replaces a same-name entry and discards the displaced backend. If that backend had been started, nothing stops it — its process outlives the gateway.\n\n## Evidence it is reachable\n\n`ReloadContext::reload_outcome` has no serialization, and it is called from three concurrent HTTP paths:\n\n- `gateway_reload_config` meta-tool — `src/gateway/meta_mcp/invoke.rs:2101`\n- admin UI reload — `src/gateway/ui/mod.rs:647`\n- every adm",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/397",
"PublishedAt": "2026-07-26T22:18:57.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 0,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "backends: stop_when_idle_for - release gateway-owned backend processes after inactivity",
"Excerpt": "## What this is\n\nStop a gateway-started backend process after it has been unused for a configured time, and restart it automatically on the next request.\n\n```yaml\nbackends:\n tavily:\n command: \"npx -y tavily-mcp@0.1.4\"\n stop_when_idle_for: 5m\n```\n\n## Why\n\nThe gateway starts backends lazily, so it never holds 24 resident children. But **once a backend is started it is never stopped.** Measured on a real 6-day-uptime machine:\n\n| backend | resident | age | CPU used |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `code",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/392",
"PublishedAt": "2026-07-26T14:30:36.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 2,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "Security: Exposed API Key Detected (openai)",
"Excerpt": "## Security Notice: Exposed API Key Detected\n\nHi there! This is an automated, good-faith security notification.\n\nThis repository appears to contain an **exposed OPENAI API key** that could lead to unauthorized charges on your account.\n\n### Details\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **File** | `src/security/firewall/redactor.rs` |\n| **Key Type** | OpenAI Project Key |\n| **Severity** | CRITICAL |\n| **Cost Risk** | GPT-4 calls can cost $0.01-0.10+ per request. Drains fast. |\n| **Detected** | re",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/377",
"PublishedAt": "2026-07-15T13:20:41.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 1,
"Reporter": "External",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "Security: Exposed API Key Detected (openai)",
"Excerpt": "## Security Notice: Exposed API Key Detected\n\nHi there! This is an automated, good-faith security notification.\n\nThis repository appears to contain an **exposed OPENAI API key** that could lead to unauthorized charges on your account.\n\n### Details\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **File** | `src/security/firewall/redactor.rs` |\n| **Key Type** | OpenAI Project Key |\n| **Severity** | CRITICAL |\n| **Cost Risk** | GPT-4 calls can cost $0.01-0.10+ per request. Drains fast. |\n| **Detected** | 20",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/376",
"PublishedAt": "2026-07-15T12:55:19.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 1,
"Reporter": "External",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
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{
"Title": "[BUG] OAuth URL misses resources (maybe?)",
"Excerpt": "## Description\nFor the OAuth login flow fails.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n```yaml\nbackends:\n influxdb-docs:\n http_url: \"https://influxdb-docs.mcp.kapa.ai\"\n oauth:\n enabled: true\n```\n\nThen try to log in using Google.\n\n## Expected Behavior\nThis should work, other MCP clients can handle that.\n\n## Actual Behavior\nIt fails, funnily with an upstream server error (I think on the google side). Then `mcp-gateway` gets this callback:\n\n`http://localhost:/o",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/369",
"PublishedAt": "2026-07-13T10:57:29.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 1,
"Reporter": "External",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "[BUG] OAuth discovery -- wrong path construction",
"Excerpt": "## Description\nFor the OAuth login flow fails.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n```yaml\nbackends:\n influxdb-docs:\n http_url: \"https://influxdb-docs.mcp.kapa.ai\"\n oauth:\n enabled: true\n```\n\n## Expected Behavior\nThis should work, other MCP clients can handle that.\n\n## Actual Behavior\nIt fails with:\n\n```text\n2026-07-09T16:00:34.754215Z INFO mcp_gateway::gateway::server::warmstart: Warm-starting ALL 1 backends (tool prefetch)\n2026-07-09T16:00:34.754239Z INFO ",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/346",
"PublishedAt": "2026-07-09T16:13:28.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 1,
"Reporter": "External",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
},
{
"Title": "[bug] fulcrum search backends fail output-schema validation on valid upstream fields (brave 'mixed'/'type', exa 'costDollars'/'searchTime')",
"Excerpt": "## DoR: PASS\n\n### Problem\nThe fulcrum capability backend's output-schema validation is too strict: it rejects valid extra fields that upstream search APIs return, so the tool **errors after a successful, authenticated API call**. Observed 2026-06-14 against `fulcrum:brave_search` and `fulcrum:exa_search`:\n\n- `brave_search` → `Parameter 'mixed': unknown parameter`, `Parameter 'type': unknown parameter` (valid: discussions, faq, infobox, locations, news, query, summarizer, videos, web).\n- `exa_sea",
"SourceUrl": "https://github.com/MikkoParkkola/mcp-gateway/issues/250",
"PublishedAt": "2026-06-14T13:53:26.000Z",
"State": "closed",
"Comments": 0,
"Reporter": "Maintainer",
"Rank": "recent",
"Extractor": "github_issue"
}
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