# MCP Task Orchestrator MCP Server

Server-enforced workflow discipline for AI agents: work items, dependency graphs, quality gates

**Publisher claimed.** No tool list reported, and Pod has not connected to this server.

## Status

Pod has not dialled MCP Task Orchestrator yet, so everything on this page is what its publisher reported rather than what we observed. Registries describe servers; they do not connect to them. Until a check runs, treat the tool list below as a claim.

## Connect

Published as `ghcr.io/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator:latest` on oci. Runs locally.

## Known issues

**20 problems reported by people outside the maintainer team.** Issues filed by the project's own owners, members and collaborators are excluded — those are release checklists and internal refactors, not things that will go wrong for you. Showing 12.

### Most discussed

### feat: Atomic work item claim mechanism for multi-agent environments

## Problem

When multiple independent agents connect to a single Task Orchestrator instance and call `get_next_item` concurrently, they receive identical recommendations. There is no exclusivity mechanism -- two agents can both receive the same QUEUE item, and only the first to call `advance_item(trigger="start")` succeeds. The second agent discovers the conflict via optimistic locking (`ConflictError` from version mismatch), but only **after** it has already committed to working on that item.

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/117) · 2026-04-16 · closed · 12 comments

### JWKS-based ActorVerifier implementation (Stage 2 actor attribution)

## Summary

Implement a concrete `ActorVerifier` that validates actor claims against JWKS keys. Stage 1 (#101, PR #105, PR #106) landed the schema, `NoOpActorVerifier`, config-driven enforcement (`auditing.enabled`), and query surfacing. This issue implements the verification half — turning `unverified` claims into `verified` or `failed`.

## Background

The `ActorVerifier` interface and `proof` field were designed for this:

```kotlin
interface ActorVerifier {
    suspend fun verify(actor: Acto

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/107) · 2026-04-14 · closed · 5 comments

### feat: Native DID document support for actor verification

## Problem

Our `JwksActorVerifier` (introduced in #107, hardened in #120, integrated with claims in #117) accepts public keys from three sources: an OIDC discovery document, a direct JWKS URI, or a local JWKS file. All three paths converge on `JWKSet.parse(body)` — i.e., the bytes must already be a JWKS envelope (`{ "keys": [...] }`).

A **DID document** is structurally different. Public keys live nested under `verificationMethod[].publicKeyJwk` (or `publicKeyMultibase`), wrapped in a W3C-defin

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/156) · 2026-04-30 · closed · 3 comments

### Resource leasing: model shared credentials a work item consumes, not just notes an agent writes

## Background

In discussion #97, a commenter [asked](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/discussions/97#discussioncomment-17774297) whether the trait system has room for *a resource a work item consumes*, as opposed to *a note the agent must write*. The motivating failure mode: multiple agent instances, each with a distinct internal identity, all present to external services as the **same credential** (same GitHub token, same deploy key). Per-agent attribution answers "which agent did

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/261) · 2026-07-25 · closed · 2 comments

### Sub-agents colliding on same tasks despite existing protection mechanisms

## Problem Description

When attempting to parallelize multiple sub-agents to take a feature and start implementing all tasks under it, the sub-agents are taking the same feature and task instead of distributing the work. This occurs despite having comprehensive protection mechanisms built into the system.

## Root Cause Analysis

After investigating the codebase, the issue is that the locking protection mechanisms exist but are **not actively being used** by the MCP tools:

### 🔍 **What's Built

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/5) · 2025-06-26 · closed · 2 comments

### Most recent

### [proposal] Guard against declared-but-never-read tool parameters

## Problem

A parameter declared in a tool's `parameterSchema` but never read on some operation's code path is accepted, silently ignored, and reported as **success**.

Confirmed live on 2026-08-04:

```
manage_items(operation="update", items=[{itemId}], traits: "delegated,needs-task-review")
→ {"updated": 1, "failed": 0}     ← merged nothing
```

`ManageItemsTool`'s update branch never read the top-level `traits` param; the create branch always had. Because the same parameter **does** work on `

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/290) · 2026-08-04 · open · 0 comments

### [proposal] Closeout convention: closure notes in confirmed past tense, written after merge-check and advance

## Problem

Closure notes (session-tracking / resolution) drafted before the merge+advance happen read "in review, awaiting merge — complete after merge" forever, even after the item is terminal and the PR merged. Two same-day retrospectives found terminal items with self-contradicting closure records, degrading the audit trail retrospectives depend on.

## Proposed change

Closeout-sequencing convention: finalize a closure note as the LAST step — merge-check (`git merge-base --is-ancestor` / PR

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/277) · 2026-07-31 · closed · 1 comment

### [proposal] Review guidance: direct existence-check before asserting a file/artifact is missing

## Problem

Review agents occasionally assert a negative claim ("file X is missing", "this will throw") without a direct verification step. Two observed instances: a reviewer pattern-matched a prior serialization bug onto an unrelated, actually-safe type; another declared a skill file missing after checking only one of the two skill directories (plugin `skills/` vs project `.claude/skills/`). Both were caught downstream, costing verification cycles.

## Proposed change

Add one checklist line to

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/276) · 2026-07-31 · closed · 1 comment

### [proposal] advance_item: singular-form validation hint + gate-block errors naming the blocked transition

## Problem

`advance_item`'s transition semantics repeatedly confuse callers. Evidence across multiple sessions: (1) callers using a singular `itemId`+`trigger` form get a generic `Missing required parameter: transitions` that doesn't name the expected batch shape; (2) gate-block errors don't say **which** transition (previousRole→targetRole) was gated, which has been misread as timing-dependent behavior — the gate is actually a deterministic function of the current phase, so successive `start` 

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/275) · 2026-07-31 · closed · 1 comment

### feat: align VerificationStatus enum to industry patterns

## Background

The current `VerificationStatus` enum has three values:

```kotlin
enum class VerificationStatus {
    UNVERIFIED,  // Proof absent or noop verifier
    VERIFIED,    // All checks passed
    FAILED       // Something went wrong
}
```

As the verification layer gains more consumers — audit logging, the claim mechanism (#117), future trust-gating, observability — two structural gaps become increasingly expensive to leave unaddressed.

---

## Gap 1 — `UNVERIFIED` conflates two disti

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/121) · 2026-04-19 · closed · 0 comments

### feat: JWKS stale-cache fallback and verification result metadata

## Background

`DefaultJwksKeySetProvider` already implements an in-memory TTL cache (configurable via `cache_ttl_seconds`, default 300s) with mutex-protected refresh. The basic caching story is solid.

The gap is **stale-on-error fallback behavior**: when the cache TTL has expired and the JWKS endpoint is temporarily unreachable, the current implementation propagates the network error up to `JwksActorVerifier`, which returns `VerificationResult(status=FAILED)`. From the caller's perspective, a 

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/120) · 2026-04-19 · closed · 0 comments

### Generic actor attribution on transitions and notes (ActorVerifier seam)

## Summary

Task history records *what* changed but not *who* changed it. In multi-agent orchestration (the dispatch pattern this project itself uses), transitions and notes are indistinguishable across the orchestrator, materialization agents, implementation agents, and review agents. Post-mortems have to infer authorship from prose.

## Problem

Three concrete gaps:

1. `advance_item` persists transitions with no actor field — history shows the status change, not the caller.
2. `manage_notes(u

[Read the thread](https://github.com/jpicklyk/task-orchestrator/issues/101) · 2026-04-11 · closed · 0 comments

[See all 17 reports Pod holds for MCP Task Orchestrator](/mcp/mcp-task-orchestrator/issues) — of 20 qualified upstream.

## Firsthand observations

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