{
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  "Kind": "DirectoryIssues",
  "Slug": "ssh-policy-gated-remote-access",
  "Name": "SSH — policy-gated remote access",
  "CanonicalUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/ssh-policy-gated-remote-access/issues",
  "ServerUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/ssh-policy-gated-remote-access",
  "IssueTotal": 25,
  "Held": 19,
  "Issues": [
    {
      "Title": "Static audit of ssh-mcp: 1 hardening suggestion, nothing exploitable",
      "Excerpt": "Hi — this is not a vulnerability report, so I'm opening it in the open\nrather than privately.\n\nI wrote an open-source static scanner for MCP servers\n([mcpaudit](https://github.com/allenwu-blip/mcpaudit)), ran it against this repo,\nthen read the source behind every hit. Full write-up below.\n\nHappy to be told I got any of it wrong.\n\n---\n\n**TL;DR:** I scanned the repository with my open-source static analyzer, `mcpaudit`. I found **one minor hardening opportunity** in the policy engine and **no exp",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/172",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-28T19:46:55.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "MCP spec conformance: 6 requirement(s) violated (via @hasmcp/mcp-spec-test) — spec 2026-07-28",
      "Excerpt": "When `ssh-mcp` (via `npx -y ssh-mcp`, no SSH backend or config needed to reproduce) is tested against the newest MCP spec revision (2026-07-28) with `@hasmcp/mcp-spec-test`, the server responds to `server/discover` with a JSON-RPC `-32601 Method not found` error, which cascades into 22 further checks being unverifiable. The same server tests fully clean (0 failures) against the older 2025-11-25 revision it also advertises support for in its handshake — so this looks like `server/discover` (a met",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/161",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-24T19:16:23.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Possible by not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root' in Dockerfile",
      "Excerpt": "Came across something in `docker/alpine-sshd/Dockerfile` around line 20 that looked worth flagging.\n\nThe Dockerfile lacks a USER directive, causing the sshd process to run as root. Running with unnecessary root privileges (CWE‑250) means any compromise of the SSH daemon gives an attacker full control over the container. This is a high‑risk issue that should be mitigated by ensuring the final USER is a non‑root user.\n\n<details>\n<summary>The code in question</summary>\n\n```\nCMD [\"/usr/sbin/sshd\", \"",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/150",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-20T16:33:35.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Timed-out exec can leave the remote process running after stdin EOF",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\nIn ssh-mcp 2.3.1, `SSHConnection.exec()` can report `Command timed out after ...` while the remote process continues running.\n\nI reproduced this against a normal OpenSSH target using a 1 second timeout and a 30 second uniquely named `sleep` process:\n\n- ssh-mcp returned the timeout error after about 1.26s;\n- the remote process was still alive at +3s;\n- it was still alive at +8s.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`connection.ts` calls `stream.end()` immediately after dispatching the exec command, which ",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/146",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-20T07:51:51.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Config doesn't seems to work on Windows",
      "Excerpt": "Installed ssh-mcp and created a `config.toml` at `%AppData%\\ssh-mcp\\config.toml` as described on README.\n\nBut when i try to run ssh-mcp: \n\n```\nFatal error: Error: No config file found and missing required --host/--user.\nEither create a config file at ~/.config/ssh-mcp/config.toml or pass --config <path>.\nFor quick start: --host=<host> --user=<user> (credentials via env vars).\n    at buildAppConfig (file:///C:/Users/<my_user>/AppData/Roaming/npm/node_modules/ssh-mcp/build/index.js:127:15)\n    at ",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/138",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-19T04:12:40.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 5,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "maxChars: the config file cannot express the \"no limit\" the CLI flag documents",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\n`--maxChars=none` disables the command-length cap. There is no way to express that in the config\nfile, so a migration from flags to a TOML config silently tightens the limit unless you notice.\n\nThis is much smaller than #95: the flag route works, so nothing is unreachable. It is a parity gap\nbetween the two ways of setting the same value.\n\n## The flag accepts three spellings of \"no limit\"\n\n`src/index.ts:56-62`:\n\n```ts\nfunction parseMaxChars(raw: string | null | undefined): number {\n ",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/123",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-12T09:12:15.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Contributor",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "roleBindings documented as configurable, but PolicyEngine always uses compiled-in DEFAULT_RULES",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\nThe README tells operators to grant a command class by editing `roleBindings` in the config file, but `roleBindings` is not read from config. `PolicyEngine` is always constructed with the compiled-in `DEFAULT_RULES`, so on a host correctly labelled `group = \"prod\"` there is no supported way to allow `privileged-command`, short of running an OPA sidecar.\n\n## The documented instruction\n\nREADME, \"Roles\":\n\n> Leaving a real production host on `prod` and granting sudo there is a policy cha",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/95",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-10T16:02:36.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Contributor",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "sudo doesnt work in v2 anymore",
      "Excerpt": "Since V2 I get the error \"POLICY_DENIED: Role \"admin\" cannot run \"privileged\" commands\" for any sudo commands, Claude wants to execute. I cant find any flags that would elevate the connections role, except through a toml file. This would be a dealbreaker for me. I just want three lines in a simple .mcp.json file, just as it was the whole time :/",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/91",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-10T08:30:54.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 12,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "ssh-mcp@1.5.0 fails to load: zod-to-json-schema imports zod/v3 but pinned zod@3.23.8 doesn't export it",
      "Excerpt": "## Symptom\n\nFresh install (`npx -y ssh-mcp --help` on a machine without a warm cache) throws on startup:\n\n```\nnode:internal/modules/esm/resolve:310\n  return new ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED(\n         ^\n\nError [ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED]: Package subpath './v3' is not defined by \"exports\" in\n/Users/.../node_modules/zod/package.json imported from\n/Users/.../node_modules/zod-to-json-schema/dist/esm/selectParser.js\n```\n\n## Root cause\n\n`ssh-mcp@1.5.0` has two conflicting dependency declarations:",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/47",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-14T20:55:45.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Contributor",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "VULN: Command Injection",
      "Excerpt": "tufantunc ssh-mcp 1.5 Command Injection\n\nA command injection flaw exists in ssh-mcp when su mode is active and the description field is appended into shell input. description only escapes # but not line breaks, so a value like foo\\nuseradd hacker is written into the root shell session (shell.write()), causing attacker-controlled commands to execute as root. This gives an adversary arbitrary root command execution through a seemingly innocuous metadata field and is a critical privilege escalation",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/44",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-07T03:31:20.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "VULN: Information Exposure Through Server Log Files",
      "Excerpt": "tufantunc ssh-mcp 1.5 Information Exposure Through Server Log Files\nA command injection flaw exists in `ssh-mcp` when `su` mode is active and the `description` field is appended into shell input. `description` only escapes `#` but not line breaks, so a value like `foo\\nuseradd hacker` is written into the root shell session (`shell.write()`), causing attacker-controlled commands to execute as root. This gives an adversary arbitrary root command execution through a seemingly innocuous metadata fie",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/43",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-07T03:30:10.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add readOnlyHint annotation to enable parallel tool calls in Claude Code",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nClaude Code serializes MCP tool calls that don't declare `readOnlyHint: true` in their tool annotations. This means when using multiple ssh-mcp server instances (one per host), all commands run sequentially rather than in parallel — even though they target independent machines.\n\n## Background\n\nPer [anthropics/claude-code#14353 (comment)](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/14353#issuecomment-3893110487), Claude Code uses the MCP `readOnlyHint` annotation to determine whe",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/36",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-02-12T21:43:06.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Security Concerns : The Lethal Trifecta",
      "Excerpt": "Have you considered how this might pose a significant security risk?\n\nLike I think this MCP server is begging to be abused in some way as it would give an LLM access to arbitrary user data on the system.. be able to communicate out to the internet.. and who knows what else.\n\nIf you aren't already aware, there is this idea called the Lethal Trifecta that I think this type of MCP server exposes user to.\n- https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/\n- https://simonwillison.net/2025/M",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/33",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-01-28T18:20:13.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 4,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Allow setting parameters using environment variables.",
      "Excerpt": "I don't want to hard code paths to the key file, so it would be awesome if it would look for things like `SSH_MCP_KEY` in environment in addition to cmd arguments.",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/32",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-01-27T23:54:46.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "An error occurred when using the MCP tool to execute the script: {\"exec\": \"MCP error -32603: Error (code 1):/nthe input device is not a TTY/n\"}",
      "Excerpt": "Can the -t parameter be added to the SSH command in the source code to resolve this issue?",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/31",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-01-23T06:41:01.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "no output since the description update",
      "Excerpt": "Since the description update, the exec tool does not return any output anymore. I am using the su shell (--suPassword).\n\nExample:\n\n```\n• Called ssh.exec({\"command\":\"echo test\",\"description\":\"Verify SSH command output.\"})\n  └\n\n```\n\nAlso, this was a minor issue even before this update:\nWhen the ssh command is too long (and since this update, if the description is too long), the tail of the command/description is returned as output.\n\nExample:\n\n```\n• Called\n  └ ssh.exec({\"command\":\"docker ps --forma",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/27",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-01-05T23:21:56.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Contributor",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Feature Request: su",
      "Excerpt": "My server does not expose the root user directly, I need to `su` from a different user after connecting, and I would not like to expose that command to the LLM.\n\nSo I would propose a setting for `su` directly like\n\n```\n{\n    \"mcpServers\": {\n        \"ssh-mcp\": {\n            \"command\": \"npx\",\n            \"args\": [\n                \"ssh-mcp\",\n                \"-y\",\n                \"--\",\n                \"--host=1.2.3.4\",\n                \"--port=22\",\n                \"--user=root\",\n                \"--pa",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/19",
      "PublishedAt": "2025-10-31T09:11:22.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "Contributor",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Ability to customise max characters",
      "Excerpt": "Hello!\n\nI'd like to be able to configure the max characters, because I use Claude Code to write a large file and it has worked fine until the MCP started blocking it. :-)\n\nThanks for a great project.",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/12",
      "PublishedAt": "2025-10-03T14:52:53.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Bug Report - SSH MCP Server",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem Information\n\n**Package:** ssh-mcp  \n**Version:** 1.0.8 (latest)  \n**Repository:** https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp  \n**Report Date:** January 2025\n\n## Error Description\n\nThe SSH MCP Server is throwing the error `keyValidator._parse is not a function` when trying to execute commands via MCP, even with correct configuration and working SSH connectivity.\n\n## Environment\n\n- **Operating System:** Windows 10 (10.0.19045)\n- **Node.js:** v20.15.0\n- **NPM:** 10.7.0\n- **MCP Client:** Cursor",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp/issues/10",
      "PublishedAt": "2025-09-29T11:04:57.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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      "25 problems reported from outside the maintainer team",
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