{
  "SchemaVersion": "1",
  "Kind": "DirectoryIssues",
  "Slug": "thread-keeper",
  "Name": "thread-keeper",
  "CanonicalUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/thread-keeper/issues",
  "ServerUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/thread-keeper",
  "IssueTotal": 39,
  "Held": 22,
  "Issues": [
    {
      "Title": "Recoverable lesson removal (soft-delete/tombstone) before curator destructive-by-default prunes unrecoverably",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nLesson removal is irreversible, and the curator is moving to\n**destructive-by-default**, so a wrongly-pruned lesson is silently lost with no\nrecovery path.\n\n- `lesson_remove()` (`threadkeeper/tools/lessons.py:187`) calls\n  `remove_lesson()` (`threadkeeper/lessons.py:135-152`), which rewrites\n  `lessons.md` to physically drop the `<!-- LESSON:BEGIN ... -->` section.\n- The only trace left is an `events` row recording the **slug + source**, not\n  the body (`threadkeeper/tools/lessons.py",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/52",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T11:46:12.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 5,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Security: de-privilege & sanitize autonomous GitHub-writing daemons (bypassPermissions, prompt injection, body redaction)",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nthread-keeper's autonomous daemons can write to a public GitHub repo and run an unsandboxed code agent, and the only barrier protecting that surface is a single prompt-level instruction. Three coupled weaknesses:\n\n1. **Output side — no mechanical redaction.** The evolve reviewer (`threadkeeper/evolve_daemon.py:216-230`) and the evolve appliers (`threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py` roadmap-issue path ~`:859`, evolve-format path ~`:1056`) run `permission_mode=\"bypassPermissions\"` with `Bas",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/22",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-14T11:02:34.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 4,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Cross-CLI ingest verification in production",
      "Excerpt": "## Status\nCross-CLI ingest is **wired** (see \\`scripts/tk_verify_ingest.py\\` for the contract test) but has only been exercised on a single dev machine. Need real-world verification across all four CLIs.\n\n## What's needed\n- Run \\`scripts/tk_verify_ingest.py\\` on a fresh machine that has been actively using Claude Code + Codex + Gemini + Copilot for at least a week\n- Confirm \\`dialog_messages.source\\` ends up with rows from all four adapters\n- Confirm \\`shadow_review_run --dry-run\\` sees cross-ad",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/1",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-14T21:23:50.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 4,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Bug: CLI MCP/hook config writes are non-atomic full-file rewrites — a crash or concurrent write can truncate ~/.claude.json (entire Claude Code state)",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nEvery adapter and the installer mutate CLI config with the pattern `cfg = json.loads(path.read_text())` then `path.write_text(json.dumps(cfg))` — a truncate-then-write with no temp-file + `os.replace` atomic swap (e.g. `threadkeeper/adapters/claude_code.py:146,159`; `threadkeeper/adapters/gemini.py`; `threadkeeper/adapters/copilot.py`; the hook helper; `threadkeeper/_setup.py` instruction writes).\n\nTwo failure modes:\n\n1. **Crash/partial write → corruption.** `write_text` truncates th",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/142",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:38:19.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add retention/GC for the tasks table and TASK_LOG_DIR spool files (unbounded growth + sensitive prompt/log persistence)",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe `tasks` table and the `TASK_LOG_DIR` spool directory grow without bound — nothing ever prunes either.\n\n- Every `spawn(...)` inserts a permanent row into `tasks` (`threadkeeper/db.py` schema: `id, pid, parent_cid, spawned_cid, cwd, prompt TEXT NOT NULL, started_at, ended_at, return_code`). There is no `DELETE FROM tasks` anywhere in the package, and `consolidate()` only dedups notes/verbatim and demotes/releases threads (`threadkeeper/tools/consolidate.py`) — it never touches `tas",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/42",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T11:44:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Curator destructive-by-default: pre-mutation snapshot/restore + structured prune/consolidate telemetry",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`THREADKEEPER_CURATOR_DESTRUCTIVE` now defaults to `1` (CHANGELOG `[Unreleased]`; `config.py` `curator_destructive: bool = True`). Once the curator daemon is enabled, the spawned LLM child writes `REPORT-<isodate>.md` and then **applies its own PRUNE / CONSOLIDATE / PATCH directly** via `lesson_remove` and `skill_manage(action='delete')` — autonomously, no human review.\n\nThe destruction has no recovery path:\n\n- `lessons.remove_lesson()` (`threadkeeper/lessons.py`) is a plain in-place",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/40",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T11:44:12.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Telemetry dashboard for shadow_review production validation",
      "Excerpt": "## Goal\nOnce \\`MEMORY_PARTNER_SHADOW_REVIEW_INTERVAL_S\\` is enabled in production (15min default), we need visibility into:\n\n- How often the daemon fires (interval ticks)\n- How many ticks resulted in \\`no_window\\` / \\`too_short\\` / \\`spawned\\`\n- How many spawned children produced a \\`MATERIALIZED:\\` outcome vs \\`SKIP:\\`\n- Skill writes attributable to shadow_review (via \\`write_origin='shadow_review'\\` in skill_usage)\n- Aggregate cost: total Claude-spawn time spent on shadow evaluation\n\n## Surfac",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/6",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-14T21:23:58.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Lessons: add surgical lesson_patch and same-slug shadow edit exemption",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n`lesson_append()` only supports wholesale same-slug overwrite, and shadow-authored lessons still hit the word-count cap. That leaves older long lessons effectively frozen: a one-line correction forces a full re-transcription, but the long-body guard blocks the only existing in-place edit path.\n\n## Proposed direction\nAdd a surgical `lesson_patch(slug, old_string, new_string)` tool, mirroring `skill_manage(action='patch')`, and allow same-slug overwrites that do not grow the lesson body",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/161",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-20T10:46:27.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Security: split Curator web research from destructive memory mutation",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nA destructive Curator child is currently granted both untrusted web-research capabilities (`WebSearch` and `WebFetch`) and tools that patch or delete durable lessons, skills, and concepts. The prompt also requires external research for every skill. Snapshot recovery and per-pass mutation caps limit damage, but they do not prevent web content from steering mutations inside the same model context.\n\nIssue #79 established this separation for the Evolve reviewer, but the equivalent Curato",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/289",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-24T19:19:26.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Port ThreadKeeper to MCP SDK 2.x before lifting the compatibility cap",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe package currently pins `mcp>=1.10.0,<2` because MCP SDK 2.0 removed the `mcp.server.fastmcp` import path and renamed `FastMCP` to `MCPServer`. Before the cap was added, fresh installs could resolve 2.0 and fail at import time.\n\nThe compatibility cap restores installations, but the codebase still imports the 1.x API directly in the MCP singleton, elicitation helper, and dialectic tool. The changelog explicitly says the 2.x port remains open, yet no roadmap issue tracks the migrati",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/279",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-10T20:20:07.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Security: untrusted GitHub comments can spoof Evolve applier claims",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe Evolve applier treats any issue comment containing `<!-- thread-keeper:evolve-applier-claim -->` as an active claim for 24 hours. `_issue_comment_is_active_claim` checks only the marker and timestamp; `_fetch_issue_comments` does not preserve or validate the comment author's association or login.\n\nBecause the repository is public, an unrelated commenter can copy the visible marker into a comment on a trusted roadmap issue. The automatic applier then skips that issue until the cla",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/277",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-08-10T20:18:17.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Learning-loop skills: no load-time re-screen for loop-authored SKILL.md after write-time gate",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\nIssue #76 added a write-time injection screen (`review_prompts.screen_injection_markers`, wired into `lesson_append` in `threadkeeper/tools/lessons.py`) so loop-synthesized memory can't carry imperative-override / remote-exec idioms at the moment it's created. That screen only runs once, at the `lesson_append` / `skill_manage(create/patch)` call site.\n\nOnce a `SKILL.md` is materialized under a loop-authored `created_by_origin` (shadow_review, candidate_review, background_review, etc.)",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/268",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-31T14:49:38.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Contributor",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Security: mechanically confine evolve web-research writes to the assigned digest",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\nThe evolve web-research phase is intentionally separated from the privileged audit phase, but it still receives a generic file-write capability. The single-digest write restriction exists only in prompt text, not as an enforced destination policy. Untrusted web content can therefore try to steer the research worker into altering repository or state files, creating an integrity and availability bridge into the later privileged audit.\n\n## Proposed direction\nReplace generic research-phas",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/263",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-25T07:50:29.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Security: curator-report applier executes any REPORT-*.md as instructions with destructive memory tools — no provenance link to the curator pass that wrote it",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`apply_curator_report` (`threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py:1353`) consumes a curator report selected purely by filesystem state: `_latest_complete_curator_report` globs `CURATOR_REPORTS_DIR.glob(\"REPORT-*.md\")`, sorts by mtime, and accepts the newest file that contains the completeness marker `CURATOR_PASS_COMPLETE` (`CURATOR_REPORT_MARKER`, line 140) and is not yet recorded as applied (`threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py:521-541`). It then reads the report's full text, inlines it into the ",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/143",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:38:21.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Bug: memory/skill nudge counters inflated by daemon *_pass and render_brief's own *_hint_shown events — nudges fire early",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`nudges._count_events_since` (`threadkeeper/nudges.py:92-118`) counts every `events` row for the session with `id > since_id`, excluding only `_NONCOUNTING_KINDS = (\"thread_hint_shown\",\"shadow_review_pass\")` plus the caller's reset kinds. But background daemons write per-tick `*_pass` events under the **foreground** session id (`identity._session_id`):\n\n- `ingest_pass` — the live ingester ticks every few seconds; non-empty passes are *always* recorded (`threadkeeper/ingest.py:48-65`,",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/141",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:38:13.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Security/data-loss: destructive curator's PROTECTED guarantee is prompt-only — foreground lessons never classified protected; skill_manage(delete) has no provenance/tier guard",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nThe curator now runs **destructive-by-default** (`THREADKEEPER_CURATOR_DESTRUCTIVE=1`, shipped in `e4c4dcf`): after writing its REPORT, the spawned child autonomously applies PRUNE/CONSOLIDATE via `lesson_remove` and `skill_manage(action='delete')` (`threadkeeper/curator.py:467-494`). The prompt claims two safety nets, but **neither is enforced at the server layer** for the entries they are meant to protect.\n\n**Lessons — the protected class is unreachable.** Both the `[PROTECTED]` in",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/139",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:37:55.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Curator destructive-by-default: [PROTECTED] invariant is prompt-only for skill patch/delete & lesson force-remove — enforce server-side",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nFlipping the curator to destructive-by-default (`THREADKEEPER_CURATOR_DESTRUCTIVE`\nnow defaults to `1`, branch `merge/curator-to-main`) hands the autonomous curator\nchild a write toolset (`lesson_append`, `lesson_remove`, `skill_manage`) under\n`permission_mode=\"auto\"`. The curator marks user/pinned/foreground entries\n`[PROTECTED]` in the inventory and the prompt says *\"NEVER touch [PROTECTED]\"* /\n*\"NEVER pass force=True\"*. But that contract is only **partially** backed by\nserver-side",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/112",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:33:08.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Hot-config reload is Claude-Code-only: config_watcher hardcodes ~/.claude/settings.json, no-ops on Codex/Gemini/Antigravity/VS Code hosts",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nHot-config reload (#2, shipped) lets the running MCP server pick up edited `THREADKEEPER_*` env knobs without a host restart. But `threadkeeper/config_watcher.py` resolves the watched file as a hardcoded `~/.claude/settings.json` (`_settings_path()`), with only a single global `THREADKEEPER_CONFIG_WATCH_PATH` override.\n\nthread-keeper ships adapters for several hosts, and each stores its MCP-server env in a **different file and format**:\n\n- Claude Code — `~/.claude/settings.json` (JSO",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/111",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:33:07.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Dockerfile installs threadkeeper unpinned — non-reproducible Glama eval build",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`Dockerfile:13` installs the package unpinned:\n\n```dockerfile\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir threadkeeper\n```\n\nThe image is the artifact Glama builds to compute the MCP Quality score (it\nspeaks MCP over stdio and inspects the tool schema — see the Dockerfile header\nand `glama.json`). An unpinned install means every rebuild silently pulls\nwhatever `threadkeeper` (and transitive `mcp` / `pydantic` / `pyyaml`) is newest\non PyPI, so:\n\n- The score is **non-reproducible** — a rebuild can e",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/110",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:32:58.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Adapter MCP-config writes are non-atomic + lock-free — interrupted/concurrent write can corrupt the host CLI's whole config (e.g. ~/.claude.json)",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nEvery CLI adapter writes the **host CLI's own config file** via a plain,\nnon-atomic `write_text(json.dumps(...))` after a read-modify-write. Examples:\n\n- `threadkeeper/adapters/claude_code.py:146,159`\n- `threadkeeper/adapters/claude_desktop.py:97,113`\n- `threadkeeper/adapters/gemini.py:120,133`\n- `threadkeeper/adapters/copilot.py:139,154`\n- `threadkeeper/adapters/vscode.py:112,128`\n- `threadkeeper/adapters/codex.py:266,284,296`\n- `threadkeeper/adapters/antigravity.py:105,121`\n\nTwo fa",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/108",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:32:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Privacy: selective erasure (\"forget this session/topic\") — no way to delete one conversation from dialog + derived stores short of rm-ing the whole DB",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\nthread-keeper auto-ingests transcripts from all connected CLIs **by default** and\nfans them out into many derived stores: `dialog_messages` (+ FTS5 + `dialog_vec`),\nnotes / `notes_vec`, the `lessons.md` store, dialectic observations/claims,\n`verbatim`, materialized skills, and per-task log files under `TASK_LOG_DIR`.\n\nThe only documented way to remove sensitive content — e.g. a session where\ncredentials, a client's confidential data, or a regretted exchange were\ndiscussed — is the RE",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/104",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:31:28.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Candidate-reviewer 'max 2 new skills per pass' cap is prompt-only — enforce server-side in skill_manage",
      "Excerpt": "## Problem\n\n`threadkeeper/candidate_reviewer.py:122-123` states the \"max 2 new skills per pass\" cap only in the LLM prompt, and `skill_manage(action='create')` is in the child's `extra_allowed_tools` (lines 368-376) with no per-pass create counter or server-side gate (no `LIMIT` check in `tools/skills.py`). The reviewer child's input is harvested user/agent dialog content, so it is prompt-injection-exposed; a confused or injected child can call `create` N times and pollute the auto-trigger skill",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/po4erk91/thread-keeper/issues/98",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-17T12:20:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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      "22 reported issues below",
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