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  "Kind": "DirectoryIssues",
  "Slug": "whoop-by-shashankswe2020-ux",
  "Name": "whoop by shashankswe2020-ux",
  "CanonicalUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/whoop-by-shashankswe2020-ux/issues",
  "ServerUrl": "https://askpod.ai/mcp/whoop-by-shashankswe2020-ux",
  "IssueTotal": 86,
  "Held": 24,
  "Issues": [
    {
      "Title": "OAuth fails",
      "Excerpt": "I have Whoop developer side variables set up as instructed, and the config .json is also correct. But OAuth throws 'invalid_client' with every attempt to open Claude and connect the MCP. Any ideas?",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/36",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-13T15:58:53.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 3,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[LOW] No token shape validation in loadTokens — add lightweight field check",
      "Excerpt": "## Source\nSecurity Audit #1 — LOW-1\n\n## Problem\n`src/auth/token-store.ts:93-99` — `loadTokens()` does `JSON.parse(raw) as OAuthTokens` without validating the shape. A corrupted or tampered `tokens.json` causes confusing runtime errors far from the source.\n\n## Fix\nAdd lightweight shape validation before returning:\n```typescript\nfunction isValidTokenShape(data: unknown): data is OAuthTokens {\n  return typeof data === \"object\" && data !== null\n    && \"access_token\" in data && typeof (data as Record",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/19",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-10T22:05:15.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[MEDIUM] Callback server binds 0.0.0.0 — bind to 127.0.0.1 only",
      "Excerpt": "## Source\nSecurity Audit #1 — MEDIUM-3\n\n## Problem\n`src/auth/callback-server.ts:159` — `server.listen(port)` with no host argument binds to `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces) by default. Any device on the local network can send requests to the callback server during the ~2-minute OAuth flow window.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker on the same network could race to submit a crafted callback. The CSRF state parameter mitigates this, but defense-in-depth says bind to loopback only.\n\n## Fix\n```typescript\nserver.liste",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/18",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-10T22:05:00.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[MEDIUM] Retry-After header not capped — server can force arbitrary sleep",
      "Excerpt": "## Source\nSecurity Audit #1 — MEDIUM-2\n\n## Problem\n`src/api/client.ts:97-104` — `parseRetryAfter()` accepts any non-negative number from the `Retry-After` header. A malicious or misconfigured server could return `Retry-After: 999999`, causing the client to sleep for ~11.5 days.\n\n## Impact\nDenial of service — the MCP server becomes unresponsive for an arbitrary duration based on a server-controlled header.\n\n## Fix\nCap the Retry-After value:\n```typescript\nconst MAX_RETRY_AFTER_MS = 60_000; // 1 mi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/17",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-10T22:04:47.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[MEDIUM] No request timeout on API client fetch — add AbortSignal.timeout",
      "Excerpt": "## Source\nSecurity Audit #1 — MEDIUM-1\n\n## Problem\n`src/api/client.ts:128-135` — `fetch()` has no `AbortSignal` or timeout. A slow or unresponsive WHOOP API permanently hangs the MCP server, which runs inside Claude Desktop's process.\n\n## Impact\nDenial of service — a hung WHOOP API (or MITM slow-loris attack) freezes the entire MCP connection requiring a Claude Desktop restart.\n\n## Fix\n```typescript\nconst REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;\n\nreturn await fetch(url, {\n  method: \"GET\",\n  headers: { ... }",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/16",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-10T22:04:29.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[HIGH] Reflected XSS in OAuth callback error page — HTML-encode message",
      "Excerpt": "## Source\nSecurity Audit #1 — HIGH-2\n\n## Problem\n`src/auth/callback-server.ts:43-49` — `errorHtml()` injects `error_description` query parameter directly into HTML without encoding:\n```typescript\nfunction errorHtml(message: string): string {\n  return `...<p>${message}</p>...</html>`;\n}\n```\nThe `message` comes from attacker-controlled `url.searchParams.get(\"error_description\")`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```\nhttp://localhost:3000/callback?error=access_denied&error_description=<script>alert('XSS')</scr",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/15",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-10T22:04:12.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[HIGH] OS command injection in openBrowser — replace exec with spawn",
      "Excerpt": "## Source\nSecurity Audit #1 — HIGH-1\n\n## Problem\n`src/auth/oauth.ts:193-199` uses `exec()` with string interpolation to launch the browser:\n```typescript\nexec(`open \"${url}\"`);\n```\nA malicious `WHOOP_CLIENT_ID` env var containing shell metacharacters (e.g., `\"; rm -rf / #`) would be interpreted by the shell, enabling arbitrary command execution.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```bash\nWHOOP_CLIENT_ID='foo\"; echo PWNED > /tmp/pwned; echo \"' node dist/index.js\n```\n\n## Fix\nReplace `exec` with `spawn` — no she",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/14",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-10T22:03:58.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Sync MCP server version with package.json instead of hardcoding",
      "Excerpt": "## Source\nCode Review Checkpoint 2 — Important Issue #2 / Suggestion #7\n\n## Problem\n`src/server.ts:122` hardcodes `version: \"0.1.0\"` in `new McpServer({ name: \"whoop-mcp\", version: \"0.1.0\" })`. When `package.json` is bumped to a new version, the MCP server will still report `0.1.0`. MCP clients display this version to users.\n\n## Fix\nPass the version from `index.ts` when wiring up in Task 9, or read from `package.json`:\n\nOption A — Accept as parameter:\n```typescript\nexport function createWhoopSer",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/13",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-04-10T21:56:20.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 2,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "top",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Token refresh never runs: parseErrorBody() double-reads the response body, throwing before the 401 branch",
      "Excerpt": "## Summary\n\n`parseErrorBody()` reads the response body twice, which throws a `TypeError` **before** the 401 token-refresh branch in `doGet()` can run. The result: once a WHOOP access token expires (~1 hour), every subsequent API call fails permanently, and the only recovery is restarting the MCP process.\n\nThere is a second, related defect in the same code path: the refreshed token is never written back to `options.accessToken`, so even after the first bug is fixed, every call repeats the full `4",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/219",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-07-29T06:49:16.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "External",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Optionally collapse the three printed-command setup branches into a lookup",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #3\n\n**Problem:** In `src/cli/setup.ts` the `claude-code` / `codex` / `copilot` branches are near-identical (label + generator + `out.write`). A `Record<ClientTarget, () => string>` lookup would remove the duplication.\n\n**Fix:** Optional refactor — map each printed-command target to its generator and emit once. Current explicit form is readable and matches existing style, so this is low priority.\n\n**Priority:** Suggestion — backlog",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/181",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:44:51.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Warn users that printed setup commands contain a plaintext secret",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #2\n\n**Problem:** In `src/cli/setup.ts`, the `claude-code`, `codex`, and `copilot` emission branches print a shell command that embeds `WHOOP_CLIENT_SECRET` in cleartext. Pasting it records the secret in shell history. Consistent with the pre-existing claude-code path (not a regression), but worth a one-line warning.\n\n**Fix:** Add a note alongside each printed command, e.g.:\n```ts\nout.write(\"Note: this command contains your client secret — your sh",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/180",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:44:43.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Strengthen Copilot setup escaping test with full shell+JSON round-trip",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #1\n\n**Problem:** `tests/cli/setup.test.ts:159-167` only asserts the generated `code --add-mcp` command `toContain('\\'')`. The Copilot path embeds creds via `JSON.stringify` then shell-quotes the whole payload, so the strongest proof is a round-trip: unwrap the shell single-quoting, `JSON.parse`, and assert the apostrophe-containing secret survives both layers intact.\n\n**Fix:**\n```ts\nconst inner = cmd.slice(cmd.indexOf(\"'\") + 1, cmd.lastIndexOf(\"'",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/179",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:44:35.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Document getOrFetch undefined-value conflation assumption",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Nit #1\n\n**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts:148-151` — `get()` returns `undefined` for both an absent key and a stored `undefined` value, so a fetcher that legitimately resolves to `undefined` would never cache-hit. Harmless today (WHOOP responses are always objects).\n\n**Fix:** Add a one-line comment noting the assumption so the cache is not silently reused for nullable values later.\n\n**Priority:** Nit (backlog)",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/177",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:11:42.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Remove or wire up the dead MemoryCache.invalidateAll() alias",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Minor #3\n\n**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts:131-133` — `invalidateAll()` is an alias for `clear()` carried over from the removed `ResourceCache` API, but nothing in `src/` calls it (the token-refresh site in `src/index.ts` calls `cache.clear()` directly). It survives only via its own unit test.\n\n**Fix:** Either remove the alias (and its test) to shrink the public surface, or point the token-refresh call site at `invalidateAll()` so the alias earns its",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/176",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:11:30.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "MemoryCache.clear() does not purge in-flight map; post-clear reader can receive pre-clear data",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Minor #1\n\n**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts` — `clear()` empties `store` and bumps `generation` but leaves the `inflight` map intact. A `getOrFetch(key)` issued after `clear()` but before the pre-clear fetch settles hits the still-present in-flight entry and resolves with the pre-clear value (returned once, not cached thanks to the generation guard). In the token-refresh path a request arriving right after `cache.clear()` can be served data fetched mi",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/174",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:11:14.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[LOW] MemoryCache.clear() does not drop the in-flight map",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Security Audit Report #9 — finding LOW-2 (`docs/security-audits/security-audit-9.md`)\n\n**Problem:** `MemoryCache.clear()` empties `store` and bumps `generation` but leaves the `inflight` map intact (`src/cache/memory-cache.ts:127-130`). If a token refresh (`cache.clear()` in `onTokenRefresh`, `src/index.ts:138`) happens while a `getOrFetch` for key K is still in flight, a later caller for K joins the **pre-refresh** in-flight promise (`src/cache/memory-cache.ts:145-170`). Because the",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/173",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:10:57.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[LOW] Path-only cache keying assumes a single WHOOP identity",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Security Audit Report #9 — finding LOW-1 (`docs/security-audits/security-audit-9.md`)\n\n**Problem:** The shared in-memory cache key is derived solely from the request path and sorted query params — `GET:${base}?${sortedParams}` (`src/api/client.ts:139-152`, `cacheKey`). A single process-wide `MemoryCache` is used (`src/index.ts:124`). This is correct for the current single-WHOOP-token design, but the server can run in `http`/`both` transport mode where multiple MCP clients connect (al",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/172",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-13T00:10:39.000Z",
      "State": "open",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add end-to-end MCP tool integration test over HTTP transport",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Code Review Checkpoint 12, Suggestion #2\n\n**Problem:** The HTTP transport tests (`tests/transport/http.test.ts`) verify auth, CORS, limits, and routing, but don't test that an actual MCP `initialize` → `tools/call` sequence works end-to-end over HTTP. Acceptance criteria include 'All 14 tools work identically over HTTP.'\n\n**Fix:** Add an integration test in Task 13g (full verification) that connects an MCP client to the HTTP server, initializes a session, and calls at least one tool.",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/161",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-03T04:07:33.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "trustProxy _realIp stored but never used — dead code in HTTP transport",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Code Review Checkpoint 12, Suggestion #1\n\n**Problem:** In `src/transport/http.ts:184-187`, the `trustProxy` option extracts the client IP from `X-Forwarded-For` into `req._realIp` but it's never read anywhere. This is dead code currently.\n\n**Fix:** Either add a comment noting this is prep for Task 13b (structured logging with request IP), or defer the implementation entirely to 13b when the logger can consume it.\n\n**Priority:** Suggestion — backlog",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/160",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-03T04:07:24.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Fix double decrement of activeConnections on body parse failure in HTTP transport",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Code Review Checkpoint 12, Issue #1\n\n**Problem:** In `src/transport/http.ts:237-244`, when JSON body parsing fails, the code explicitly decrements `activeConnections` AND the previously-registered `res.on(\"close\")` handler also decrements it when the response ends. This double-decrement drives the counter negative over time, effectively disabling connection limiting after enough malformed requests.\n\n**Fix:** Remove the explicit `activeConnections--` in the catch block. The `res.on(\"c",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/159",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-06-03T04:07:13.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "Add test coverage for get_calendar with start parameter",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Checkpoint 11, Suggestion #2\n\n**Problem:** `tests/tools/get-calendar.test.ts` tests `days` and default behavior but never exercises the `start` parameter path. The semantic issue in the start parameter (Issue #154) would have been caught with explicit tests.\n\n**Fix:** Add tests:\n- `it('uses start parameter to determine grid origin')`\n- `it('handles start + days interaction correctly')`\n- `it('handles start date in the future gracefully')`\n\n**Priority:** Suggestion — v0.4.1",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/157",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-31T06:45:21.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "get_calendar workout_count field is always 0 (dead placeholder)",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Checkpoint 11, Suggestion #1\n\n**Problem:** In `src/tools/get-calendar.ts:178`, `workout_count` is hard-coded to 0 with comment \"Workout count not available from cycle endpoint directly.\" This returns misleading data to consumers — hard-coded zeros look like real data.\n\n**Fix:** Either remove the `workout_count` field from `CalendarDay` interface until it can be implemented, or fetch the workout endpoint to populate it.\n\n**Priority:** Suggestion — backlog",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/156",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-31T06:45:11.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "get_today returns empty snapshot instead of throwing when all primaries fail",
      "Excerpt": "**Source:** Checkpoint 11, Important Issue #2\n\n**Problem:** In `src/tools/get-today.ts:128-132`, the throw condition requires BOTH all primaries AND workout to fail. If recovery+sleep+cycle all fail but workout succeeds, the function returns `{recovery: null, sleep: null, strain: null, summary: \"No data available yet today\"}`. This is useless because workout data only surfaces inside the strain block (which requires cycle). Violates the spec: \"If ALL endpoints fail, throws error (not partial emp",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/155",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-31T06:45:02.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 1,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    },
    {
      "Title": "[LOW] compare_periods: Add ISO 8601 regex validation to date input schema",
      "Excerpt": "Source: Security Audit 7, Finding LOW-2\n\nProblem: compare_periods tool in src/server.ts:345-352 uses bare z.string() for date parameters without regex validation. While the handler correctly rejects invalid dates via validateDateRange(), the error messages for completely malformed input may confuse LLM clients.\n\nImpact: No security vulnerability. Input is safely rejected at the validation boundary. Improvement to schema strictness and error clarity.\n\nFix: Add .regex() to the Zod schema for all f",
      "SourceUrl": "https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/153",
      "PublishedAt": "2026-05-31T06:40:38.000Z",
      "State": "closed",
      "Comments": 0,
      "Reporter": "Maintainer",
      "Rank": "recent",
      "Extractor": "github_issue"
    }
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