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whoop by shashankswe2020-ux MCP Server

MCP server for WHOOP health data — recovery, sleep, workouts, cycles, and trends.

Publisher claimed. No tool list reported, and Pod has not connected to this server.

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Published as whoop-ai-mcp on npm. Runs locally.

Reviewed GitHub reports

86 GitHub reports passed Pod's relevance review. This can include external user reports, maintainer-confirmed bugs, and concrete feature gaps. It is evidence to inspect, not a count of distinct defects. Showing 12.

Most discussed

OAuth fails

I have Whoop developer side variables set up as instructed, and the config .json is also correct. But OAuth throws 'invalid_client' with every attempt to open Claude and connect the MCP. Any ideas?

Read the thread · 2026-04-13 · closed · external user · 3 comments

[LOW] No token shape validation in loadTokens — add lightweight field check

Source

Security Audit #1 — LOW-1

Problem

src/auth/token-store.ts:93-99 — loadTokens() does JSON.parse(raw) as OAuthTokens without validating the shape. A corrupted or tampered tokens.json causes confusing runtime errors far from the source.

Fix

Add lightweight shape validation before returning:

function isValidTokenShape(data: unknown): data is OAuthTokens {
  return typeof data === "object" && data !== null
    && "access_token" in data && typeof (data as Record

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/19) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### [MEDIUM] Callback server binds 0.0.0.0 — bind to 127.0.0.1 only

## Source
Security Audit #1 — MEDIUM-3

## Problem
`src/auth/callback-server.ts:159` — `server.listen(port)` with no host argument binds to `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces) by default. Any device on the local network can send requests to the callback server during the ~2-minute OAuth flow window.

## Impact
An attacker on the same network could race to submit a crafted callback. The CSRF state parameter mitigates this, but defense-in-depth says bind to loopback only.

## Fix
```typescript
server.liste

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/18) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### [MEDIUM] Retry-After header not capped — server can force arbitrary sleep

## Source
Security Audit #1 — MEDIUM-2

## Problem
`src/api/client.ts:97-104` — `parseRetryAfter()` accepts any non-negative number from the `Retry-After` header. A malicious or misconfigured server could return `Retry-After: 999999`, causing the client to sleep for ~11.5 days.

## Impact
Denial of service — the MCP server becomes unresponsive for an arbitrary duration based on a server-controlled header.

## Fix
Cap the Retry-After value:
```typescript
const MAX_RETRY_AFTER_MS = 60_000; // 1 mi

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/17) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### [MEDIUM] No request timeout on API client fetch — add AbortSignal.timeout

## Source
Security Audit #1 — MEDIUM-1

## Problem
`src/api/client.ts:128-135` — `fetch()` has no `AbortSignal` or timeout. A slow or unresponsive WHOOP API permanently hangs the MCP server, which runs inside Claude Desktop's process.

## Impact
Denial of service — a hung WHOOP API (or MITM slow-loris attack) freezes the entire MCP connection requiring a Claude Desktop restart.

## Fix
```typescript
const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;

return await fetch(url, {
  method: "GET",
  headers: { ... }

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/16) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### Most recent

### Token refresh never runs: parseErrorBody() double-reads the response body, throwing before the 401 branch

## Summary

`parseErrorBody()` reads the response body twice, which throws a `TypeError` **before** the 401 token-refresh branch in `doGet()` can run. The result: once a WHOOP access token expires (~1 hour), every subsequent API call fails permanently, and the only recovery is restarting the MCP process.

There is a second, related defect in the same code path: the refreshed token is never written back to `options.accessToken`, so even after the first bug is fixed, every call repeats the full `4

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/219) · 2026-07-29 · closed · external user · 1 comment

### Optionally collapse the three printed-command setup branches into a lookup

**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #3

**Problem:** In `src/cli/setup.ts` the `claude-code` / `codex` / `copilot` branches are near-identical (label + generator + `out.write`). A `Record<ClientTarget, () => string>` lookup would remove the duplication.

**Fix:** Optional refactor — map each printed-command target to its generator and emit once. Current explicit form is readable and matches existing style, so this is low priority.

**Priority:** Suggestion — backlog

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/181) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Warn users that printed setup commands contain a plaintext secret

**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #2

**Problem:** In `src/cli/setup.ts`, the `claude-code`, `codex`, and `copilot` emission branches print a shell command that embeds `WHOOP_CLIENT_SECRET` in cleartext. Pasting it records the secret in shell history. Consistent with the pre-existing claude-code path (not a regression), but worth a one-line warning.

**Fix:** Add a note alongside each printed command, e.g.:
```ts
out.write("Note: this command contains your client secret — your sh

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/180) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Strengthen Copilot setup escaping test with full shell+JSON round-trip

**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #1

**Problem:** `tests/cli/setup.test.ts:159-167` only asserts the generated `code --add-mcp` command `toContain('\'')`. The Copilot path embeds creds via `JSON.stringify` then shell-quotes the whole payload, so the strongest proof is a round-trip: unwrap the shell single-quoting, `JSON.parse`, and assert the apostrophe-containing secret survives both layers intact.

**Fix:**
```ts
const inner = cmd.slice(cmd.indexOf("'") + 1, cmd.lastIndexOf("'

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/179) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Document getOrFetch undefined-value conflation assumption

**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Nit #1

**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts:148-151` — `get()` returns `undefined` for both an absent key and a stored `undefined` value, so a fetcher that legitimately resolves to `undefined` would never cache-hit. Harmless today (WHOOP responses are always objects).

**Fix:** Add a one-line comment noting the assumption so the cache is not silently reused for nullable values later.

**Priority:** Nit (backlog)

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/177) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Remove or wire up the dead MemoryCache.invalidateAll() alias

**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Minor #3

**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts:131-133` — `invalidateAll()` is an alias for `clear()` carried over from the removed `ResourceCache` API, but nothing in `src/` calls it (the token-refresh site in `src/index.ts` calls `cache.clear()` directly). It survives only via its own unit test.

**Fix:** Either remove the alias (and its test) to shrink the public surface, or point the token-refresh call site at `invalidateAll()` so the alias earns its

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/176) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### MemoryCache.clear() does not purge in-flight map; post-clear reader can receive pre-clear data

**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Minor #1

**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts` — `clear()` empties `store` and bumps `generation` but leaves the `inflight` map intact. A `getOrFetch(key)` issued after `clear()` but before the pre-clear fetch settles hits the still-present in-flight entry and resolves with the pre-clear value (returned once, not cached thanks to the generation guard). In the token-refresh path a request arriving right after `cache.clear()` can be served data fetched mi

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/174) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

[See all 24 reports Pod holds for whoop by shashankswe2020-ux](/mcp/whoop-by-shashankswe2020-ux/issues) — of 86 qualified upstream.

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