gaggiuino-mcp MCP Server

Remote MCP server for your Gaggiuino espresso machine's shots and profiles

Publisher claimed. No tool list reported, and Pod has not connected to this server.

Status

Pod has not dialled gaggiuino-mcp yet, so everything on this page is what its publisher reported rather than what we observed. Registries describe servers; they do not connect to them. Until a check runs, treat the tool list below as a claim.

Connect

Published as ghcr.io/ljcl/gaggiuino-mcp:4.0.0 on oci. Runs locally.

Known issues

88 problems reported by people outside the maintainer team. Issues filed by the project's own owners, members and collaborators are excluded — those are release checklists and internal refactors, not things that will go wrong for you. Showing 12.

Most discussed

fix(server): make the consent token stateless so /oauth/authorize cannot be evicted

Found while writing the tests for #108/#109 (PR #118). Not a vulnerability that grants anything — it is an availability defect on the login path, and the fix removes a store rather than adding a guard.

What is wrong

handleGet in apps/server/src/oauth/authorize.ts calls codes.remember(...) to park the validated authorization request before any authentication happens — it has to, because the CSRF token in the form is the key to that parked request. createCodeStore's pending ma

Read the thread · 2026-08-05 · closed · 2 comments

feat(server): zero-click Tailscale identity at /oauth/authorize

/oauth/authorize is the only endpoint a human's browser touches. On a tailnet, Tailscale already knows who that human is — so the owner passphrase (#109) could be skipped entirely, and the consent step would become physically uncompletable from the public internet. tsidp does exactly this: server/authorize.go refuses the route over Funnel with "they are not part of the tailnet that they are trying to be authenticated for."

The mechanism is real. Verified in tailscale/tailscale, `ipn/i

Read the thread · 2026-08-05 · open · 2 comments

chore(server): drop the MCP_AUTH_TOKEN startup tombstone

#111 kept env.MCP_AUTH_TOKEN read solely so a deployment that still sets it fails loudly at startup rather than silently serving an open /mcp. One release after 2.0.0, remove it:

the startup check and its ConfigError;
the .env.example tombstone line and its explanatory comment — envExample.test.ts enforces this direction too, so the code and the template must move in the same commit;
any remaining mention in README, SECURITY.md, AGENTS.md, server.json, turbo.json.

No behavi

Read the thread · 2026-08-05 · closed · 2 comments

feat(server)!: remove MCP_AUTH_TOKEN in favour of OAuth

This is the breaking change. It lands only after OAuth works end to end against the owner's real connector on iOS (#113's probe is the gate). Nothing before this point removes anything.

Why the token goes rather than staying alongside

It is a control the owner cannot configure, and one nobody on a personal plan can. Keeping it means two auth mechanisms, two sets of gate ordering to reason about, and a writeToolDisabled that answers a per-request question by reading the process envir

Read the thread · 2026-08-05 · closed · 2 comments

feat(server): delegate to an external issuer with MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER

The built-in AS (#108, #109) is the default because it keeps the one-container promise. It should not be the only path — plenty of self-hosters already run Authentik, Authelia, Keycloak, Zitadel or Kanidm, and a Tailscale user may prefer tsidp. This makes that a one-variable choice against code that already exists.

Anthropic supports it with no extra ceremony: *"A cross-host authorization server doesn't need anything special on its own. The authorization_servers field in your protected reso

Read the thread · 2026-08-05 · closed · 2 comments

Most recent

epic: loose-boundary tolerance

Batch 3 of the 2026-08-22 codebase improvement audit.

Why these belong together

Four places where a malformed or hostile input takes down more than it should. The repo already has a posture here, stated in AGENTS.md: upstream payloads are validated at the client boundary with deliberately loose schemas so a firmware revision cannot take the server down, maintenance.ts routes uninterpretable keys to extras rather than failing, and expected failures are results rather than exceptions. The

Read the thread · 2026-08-23 · open · 0 comments

epic: the /mcp gate and the OAuth path

Batch 1 of the 2026-08-22 codebase improvement audit.

Why these belong together

The first two are not adjacent issues, they are one edit. Both restructure the same block of apps/server/src/http.ts (:203-239):

#176 moves authenticate to run after checkRequest, restoring the ordering mcpAuth.ts documents and this file currently defeats.
#185 wraps the gate's rejection in withCors so an allowlisted browser origin can read the 401 challenge.

They also interact in a way neith

Read the thread · 2026-08-23 · open · 0 comments

chore(repo): add a CONTRIBUTING pointer to the local verification gates

Why

Dev commands live accurately in README §Development, but nothing onboards a contributor to the actual working loop: check vs check:affected, the coverage-ratchet rule (commit the raised numbers; never hand-edit vitest.config.ts), story screenshots for visual review, fake-machine for machineless development, and the fact that the squash-merged PR title is the only thing release-please reads.