gam-seller-mcp-node MCP Server
Governed, read-only MCP server exposing Google Ad Manager inventory discovery to buyer agents
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Status
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Connect
Published as gam-seller-mcp-node on npm. Runs locally.
Known issues
19 problems reported by people outside the maintainer team. Issues filed by the project's own owners, members and collaborators are excluded — those are release checklists and internal refactors, not things that will go wrong for you. Showing 12.
Most discussed
README security section should state the hash-chain attribution boundary (ADR-4)
hashEntry covers { seq, event_class, payload, prev_hash, timestamp } (src/audit/event.ts:54) and deliberately excludes the top-level buyer_id / request_id (ADR-4 decision B, event.ts:43-45). This is a sound tradeoff — it lets crypto-shred (Art. 17) anonymize entries without breaking the chain — but the README's "every decision audited / hash-chained" reads as if attribution is tamper-evident. Reattribution of an entry's top-level actor is not covered by the chain (the pseudonym
Read the thread · 2026-08-10 · closed · 2 comments
Add JSDoc to public-facing types in catalog/store.ts and pricing/store.ts
What to do
Add JSDoc comments to the exported interfaces and types that buyer agents and publisher operators interact with:
- `ProductFamily` in `src/catalog/store.ts`
- `FamilyPrice` in `src/pricing/store.ts`
- `ForecastBucket` in `src/forecast/engine.ts`
- `DeploymentConfig` in `src/config/deployment.ts`
Example
/** A coarse product family visible to an entitled buyer agent.
* Raw inventory IDs, deal IDs, and exact floor prices are never included.
*/
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/10) · 2026-07-22 · open · 2 comments
### RFC: Bucket thresholds — define what Low / Mid / High means in impression terms
## Background
\`get_forecast\` returns one of three buckets: \`low\`, \`mid\`, \`high\`. The current implementation is synthetic and deterministic. When the real GAM ForecastService adapter lands (#4), the engine will need to map actual impression forecasts to these three values.
The thresholds are not yet defined. This issue is the place to discuss and ratify them.
## Questions
**Absolute vs relative thresholds?**
- Absolute: \`low < 100k impressions\`, \`mid = 100k–1M\`, \`high > 1M\`
- Re
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/12) · 2026-07-22 · closed · 1 comment
### Production transport: TLS termination, bind posture, and single-instance limitation
## Problem
The HTTP transport binds loopback and expects a reverse proxy to terminate TLS; there is no in-process TLS. And the rate limiter, replay guard, and intent store are in-memory per process, so the node is **single-instance** — scaling out would split that state.
**Anchor:** `docs/PUBLISHER-DEPLOYMENT.md` (reverse-proxy + single-instance notes) and `src/http.ts` (bind).
## Impact
A publisher deploying without a correctly configured TLS-terminating proxy exposes plaintext; a publisher
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/86) · 2026-08-18 · open · 0 comments
### Head-hash anchor is a local rewritable file — move to external WORM / Object Lock for production
## Problem
The tamper-evidence guarantee assumes the head-hash anchor lives in an **append-only external** store. Today it is written to a local file with a rewritable `writeFileSync`.
**Anchor:** `src/audit/anchor.ts` — the code comment itself notes: *"Production: use cloud-immutable write instead (never overwrite)."*
## Impact
An adversary who can rewrite the local ledger can also rewrite the local anchor alongside it, defeating the "tamper with the local file alone isn't enough" property.
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/85) · 2026-08-18 · open · 0 comments
### Most recent
### issue-buyer-token.ts leaves an un-anchored ledger → server fail-closes on next startup (no_anchor_but_non_empty_ledger)
## Summary
Minting a buyer token with the documented CLI (`scripts/issue-buyer-token.ts`) on a fresh state writes a `TOKEN_ISSUANCE` event to the persistent audit ledger but never anchors the head. The **next server startup then aborts fail-closed**:
Fatal: [audit] FATAL: ledger integrity check failed on startup (no_anchor_but_non_empty_ledger) — refusing to serve requests with a suspect chain. Investigate the ledger and anchor before restarting.
So the node won't start after followin
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/73) · 2026-08-12 · closed · 0 comments
### Add a structural test that every authenticated tool routes through policy (scope gate)
`resolveScope()` (the policy/allowlist gate) is invoked **manually inside each authenticated handler** (`src/server.ts:228, 290, 354, 442`), not enforced by the tool-registration path. The README states *"Adding a new tool in the future cannot bypass this"* (`README.md:218`), but there is no wrapper and no test that enforces it: a new `server.tool(...)` that omits the `authenticate` / `resolveScope` calls would bypass policy silently.
All 5 current surfaces are correctly gated — `well_known_cap
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/67) · 2026-08-10 · closed · 0 comments
### Persistence-health surfacing (v0.6 E1) only covers the ledger; extend to the other 4 stores + /health
**Tier:** 1–2 (integrity / observability)
**Use case**
v0.6 added a persistence-health flag to `AuditLedger` (`isPersistenceHealthy()`, `src/audit/ledger.ts`) and surfaced it through `GET /health` (v0.8, `status:"degraded"`). But the other four disk-backed stores still **swallow write failures** as a benign `WARNING`:
- `src/audit/pseudonym.ts`
- `src/audit/anchor.ts`
- `src/audit/retention.ts`
- `src/identity/denylist.ts`
(all matched by `grep -rn "could not persist" src/`).
**Why it matter
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/51) · 2026-07-30 · closed · 0 comments
### Intent store is in-memory only: committed intents are lost on restart
**Tier:** 1 (durability of a core surface)
**Describe the bug**
`IntentStore` holds intents in a plain in-memory `Map` with no persistence (`src/intent/store.ts:45` — `private readonly byId = new Map(...)`, no `persistPath`), unlike the ledger (`src/audit/ledger.ts`) and denylist (`src/identity/denylist.ts`) which are file-backed. So a node restart drops all live intents.
This was acceptable in v0.5 (create-only, no read/revoke surface). It stopped being acceptable in **v0.7**, which added `re
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/50) · 2026-07-30 · closed · 0 comments
### Add integration test: pricing_options absent when valid_until has expired
## Context
\`PricingStore.priceFor()\` returns \`undefined\` for expired prices (fail-closed). This is unit-tested in \`tests/pricing.test.ts\`. However, the end-to-end buyer-agent session test (\`tests/buyer-agent-session.test.ts\`) only covers the happy path (valid price → \`pricing_options\` present).
## What to add
A new \`it()\` block in \`tests/buyer-agent-session.test.ts\` or \`tests/server.test.ts\` that:
1. Builds a server with a \`PricingStore\` configured with an **already-expired
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/11) · 2026-07-22 · closed · 0 comments
### OpenRTB 3.0 product taxonomy: align family_id scheme with IAB standards
## Context
Currently, \`family_id\` values are publisher-defined free-form strings (\`"display-ros"\`, \`"video-pre-roll"\`). A buyer agent connecting to multiple seller nodes has no way to know that \`"display-ros"\` at Publisher A is the same product type as \`"display-banner"\` at Publisher B.
Aligning \`family_id\` with the [OpenRTB 3.0](https://iabtechlab.com/standards/openrtb/) / [AdCOM](https://iabtechlab.com/standards/adcom/) taxonomy would make family IDs interoperable across publishe
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/9) · 2026-07-22 · open · 0 comments
### Prometheus metrics endpoint: observability for production deployments
## Context
In a production deployment, operators need to monitor:
- Request rates per buyer and per tool
- Auth failure rates (spike = probing or misconfigured buyer)
- Rate-limit hit frequency
- Audit ledger size and last anchor time
- Forecast bucket distribution (to detect synthetic vs real data divergence)
Currently, none of this is observable without reading the audit ledger files directly.
## Proposed endpoint
A scrape-friendly Prometheus metrics endpoint at \`/metrics\` (not exposed t
[Read the thread](https://github.com/juan-sibbo/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues/8) · 2026-07-22 · closed · 0 comments
[See all 16 reports Pod holds for gam-seller-mcp-node](/mcp/gam-seller-mcp-node/issues) — of 19 qualified upstream.
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