postgres-scout-mcp MCP Server
Scout your PostgreSQL databases with AI - safety features, monitoring, and data quality
Publisher claimed. No tool list reported, and Pod has not connected to this server.
Status
Pod has not dialled postgres-scout-mcp yet, so everything on this page is what its publisher reported rather than what we observed. Registries describe servers; they do not connect to them. Until a check runs, treat the tool list below as a claim.
Connect
Published as postgres-scout-mcp on npm. Runs locally.
Known issues
17 problems reported by people outside the maintainer team. Issues filed by the project's own owners, members and collaborators are excluded — those are release checklists and internal refactors, not things that will go wrong for you. Showing 12.
Most discussed
Make file logging opt-in instead of default
Problem
The Logger in postgres-scout-mcp always creates a ./logs directory and writes log files to disk by default. In contrast, mongo-scout-mcp uses an ENABLE_LOGGING environment variable that defaults to false, making file logging opt-in.
Expected Behavior
File logging should be opt-in via ENABLE_LOGGING=true environment variable, matching the pattern used in mongo-scout-mcp.
Current Behavior
- Logger constructor unconditionally creates the log directory
- Every
log()c
Read the thread · 2026-03-07 · closed · 0 comments
DDL operations unrestricted in read-write mode
Summary
Read-write mode allows all DDL operations (CREATE, ALTER, DROP, TRUNCATE) via executeQuery with no additional confirmation or restriction.
Affected Files
src/utils/sanitize.ts—ALLOWED_READ_WRITE_OPERATIONS(lines 4-9)
Problem
Read-write mode is intended for safe data modifications (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE with guards). However, it also allows destructive DDL like DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, and ALTER TABLE through the general executeQuery tool, without the safety
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
Log injection via unsanitized tool arguments
Summary
Tool names and arguments are logged without sanitization, allowing control characters and newlines to pollute or forge log entries.
Affected Files
src/server/setup.ts— line 51:logger.info('mcp', \Tool called: ${name}`, { args })`src/utils/logger.ts
Problem
If tool arguments contain newlines or control characters, they are written directly to log files. This could be used to forge log entries or mask malicious activity in the audit trail.
Suggested Fix
St
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
No server-side cap on maxRows for mutation tools
Summary
The maxRows parameter in safeUpdate and safeDelete is fully controlled by the MCP client with no server-side upper bound.
Affected Files
src/tools/mutations.ts—SafeUpdateSchema(line 28),SafeDeleteSchema(line 38)
Problem
The maxRows parameter defaults to 1000 but can be set to any number by the agent. There is no server-enforced maximum. An agent can pass maxRows: 999999999 to effectively disable the safety guard.
Suggested Fix
Add a server-side m
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
Rate limiting disabled by default
Summary
Rate limiting is disabled by default, providing no protection against rapid-fire tool calls.
Affected Files
src/config/environment.ts— line 42:enableRateLimit: process.env.ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT === 'true'
Problem
The rate limiter exists but defaults to off. Without rate limiting, there is no throttling of tool invocations, making it easier to abuse expensive operations or amplify other vulnerabilities.
Suggested Fix
Enable rate limiting by default. Users who need h
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
Most recent
SQL injection via condition parameter in checkConstraintViolations
Summary
The condition parameter in checkConstraintViolations is validated by validateCondition() which uses the same insufficient denylist as WHERE clause validation, then interpolated directly into SQL.
Affected Files
src/tools/data-quality.ts—checkConstraintViolations()(lines 350-355)src/utils/sanitize.ts—validateCondition()(lines 136-154)
Problem
validateCondition() applies the same limited WHERE_DANGEROUS_PATTERNS denylist. The validated string is t
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
optimizeQuery ignores read-only ANALYZE restriction
Summary
The optimizeQuery tool always runs EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, ...) regardless of the server mode, bypassing the read-only protection that explainQuery correctly enforces.
Affected Files
src/tools/optimization.ts—optimizeQuery()(line 973)- Compare with
src/tools/query.ts—explainQueryTool()(lines 54-56) which correctly forcesanalyze=false
Problem
explainQueryTool checks connection.config.mode and forces analyze=false in read-only mode. optimizeQuery h
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
SQL injection via raw SET string in safeUpdate
Summary
When allowRawSet=true, the SET clause in safeUpdate is directly interpolated into the UPDATE query with no sanitization or parameterization.
Affected Files
src/tools/mutations.ts—safeUpdate()(lines 261-265)
Problem
When set is a string and allowRawSet=true, the value is assigned directly to setClause and embedded in the UPDATE query. No validation, escaping, or parameterization is applied to the string content.
While this is opt-in (disabled by default),
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
SQL injection via WHERE clause parameters across multiple tools
Summary
The where parameter accepted by multiple tools is validated using a denylist of regex patterns, then string-interpolated directly into SQL queries. The denylist is insufficient and allows several classes of injection.
Affected Files
src/utils/sanitize.ts—validateUserWhereClause()(lines 111-134)src/tools/mutations.ts—previewUpdate,previewDelete,safeUpdate,safeDeletesrc/tools/export.ts—exportTable,generateInsertStatements- `src/tools/tempo
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
Read-only mode bypass via CTE with writable main statement
Summary
The read-only mode enforcement in sanitizeQuery() can be bypassed when using CTEs (Common Table Expressions) combined with data-modifying main statements.
Affected Files
src/utils/sanitize.ts—sanitizeQuery()function (lines 42-74)
Problem
The operation check only inspects the first keyword of the query. When a query starts with WITH, it is allowed in read-only mode. The CTE_DATA_MODIFYING_PATTERN only checks the CTE body, not the main statement that follows. T
Read the thread · 2026-02-28 · closed · 0 comments
Parameter validation and documentation gaps
Weaknesses
Parameter validation inconsistencies:
- getHealthScore accepts nonexistent database names without error
- Some enum values aren't intuitive (had to guess cache not cache_hit_ratio)
Missing pg_stat_statements dependency - getSlowQueries fails silently without the extension
Documentation gaps - Had to discover valid enum values through trial and error
Row estimates show -1 - listTables shows rowEstimate: -1 for all tables (needs ANALYZE)
Verdict
Solid tool for data
Read the thread · 2025-12-22 · closed · 0 comments
Document safeUpdate raw SET opt‑in (allowRawSet) in tool metadata and README
We introduced allowRawSet to make safeUpdate reject raw SET strings by default. This is a backward‑compatibility change for clients that previously passed a string set. Update the MCP tool description and README examples to clearly indicate that raw SET strings now require allowRawSet=true. This helps agents and users understand the new safety behavior and avoid unexpected errors.
Read the thread · 2025-12-22 · closed · 0 comments
See all 16 reports Pod holds for postgres-scout-mcp — of 17 qualified upstream.
Firsthand observations
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For agents
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