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whoop MCP Server

MCP server for WHOOP health data — recovery, sleep, workouts, cycles, and trends.

Publisher claimed. No tool list reported, and Pod has not connected to this server.

Status

Pod has not dialled whoop yet, so everything on this page is what its publisher reported rather than what we observed. Registries describe servers; they do not connect to them. Until a check runs, treat the tool list below as a claim.

Connect

Published as whoop-ai-mcp on npm. Runs locally.

Known issues

86 problems reported by people outside the maintainer team. Issues filed by the project's own owners, members and collaborators are excluded — those are release checklists and internal refactors, not things that will go wrong for you. Showing 12.

Most discussed

OAuth fails

I have Whoop developer side variables set up as instructed, and the config .json is also correct. But OAuth throws 'invalid_client' with every attempt to open Claude and connect the MCP. Any ideas?

Read the thread · 2026-04-13 · closed · external user · 3 comments

[LOW] No token shape validation in loadTokens — add lightweight field check

Source

Security Audit #1 — LOW-1

Problem

src/auth/token-store.ts:93-99 — loadTokens() does JSON.parse(raw) as OAuthTokens without validating the shape. A corrupted or tampered tokens.json causes confusing runtime errors far from the source.

Fix

Add lightweight shape validation before returning:

function isValidTokenShape(data: unknown): data is OAuthTokens {
  return typeof data === "object" && data !== null
    && "access_token" in data && typeof (data as Record

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/19) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### [MEDIUM] Callback server binds 0.0.0.0 — bind to 127.0.0.1 only

## Source
Security Audit #1 — MEDIUM-3

## Problem
`src/auth/callback-server.ts:159` — `server.listen(port)` with no host argument binds to `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces) by default. Any device on the local network can send requests to the callback server during the ~2-minute OAuth flow window.

## Impact
An attacker on the same network could race to submit a crafted callback. The CSRF state parameter mitigates this, but defense-in-depth says bind to loopback only.

## Fix
```typescript
server.liste

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/18) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### [MEDIUM] Retry-After header not capped — server can force arbitrary sleep

## Source
Security Audit #1 — MEDIUM-2

## Problem
`src/api/client.ts:97-104` — `parseRetryAfter()` accepts any non-negative number from the `Retry-After` header. A malicious or misconfigured server could return `Retry-After: 999999`, causing the client to sleep for ~11.5 days.

## Impact
Denial of service — the MCP server becomes unresponsive for an arbitrary duration based on a server-controlled header.

## Fix
Cap the Retry-After value:
```typescript
const MAX_RETRY_AFTER_MS = 60_000; // 1 mi

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/17) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### [MEDIUM] No request timeout on API client fetch — add AbortSignal.timeout

## Source
Security Audit #1 — MEDIUM-1

## Problem
`src/api/client.ts:128-135` — `fetch()` has no `AbortSignal` or timeout. A slow or unresponsive WHOOP API permanently hangs the MCP server, which runs inside Claude Desktop's process.

## Impact
Denial of service — a hung WHOOP API (or MITM slow-loris attack) freezes the entire MCP connection requiring a Claude Desktop restart.

## Fix
```typescript
const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;

return await fetch(url, {
  method: "GET",
  headers: { ... }

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/16) · 2026-04-10 · closed · 2 comments

### Most recent

### Token refresh never runs: parseErrorBody() double-reads the response body, throwing before the 401 branch

## Summary

`parseErrorBody()` reads the response body twice, which throws a `TypeError` **before** the 401 token-refresh branch in `doGet()` can run. The result: once a WHOOP access token expires (~1 hour), every subsequent API call fails permanently, and the only recovery is restarting the MCP process.

There is a second, related defect in the same code path: the refreshed token is never written back to `options.accessToken`, so even after the first bug is fixed, every call repeats the full `4

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/219) · 2026-07-29 · closed · external user · 1 comment

### Optionally collapse the three printed-command setup branches into a lookup

**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #3

**Problem:** In `src/cli/setup.ts` the `claude-code` / `codex` / `copilot` branches are near-identical (label + generator + `out.write`). A `Record<ClientTarget, () => string>` lookup would remove the duplication.

**Fix:** Optional refactor — map each printed-command target to its generator and emit once. Current explicit form is readable and matches existing style, so this is low priority.

**Priority:** Suggestion — backlog

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/181) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Warn users that printed setup commands contain a plaintext secret

**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #2

**Problem:** In `src/cli/setup.ts`, the `claude-code`, `codex`, and `copilot` emission branches print a shell command that embeds `WHOOP_CLIENT_SECRET` in cleartext. Pasting it records the secret in shell history. Consistent with the pre-existing claude-code path (not a regression), but worth a one-line warning.

**Fix:** Add a note alongside each printed command, e.g.:
```ts
out.write("Note: this command contains your client secret — your sh

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/180) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Strengthen Copilot setup escaping test with full shell+JSON round-trip

**Source:** Code review checkpoint 14, Suggestion #1

**Problem:** `tests/cli/setup.test.ts:159-167` only asserts the generated `code --add-mcp` command `toContain('\'')`. The Copilot path embeds creds via `JSON.stringify` then shell-quotes the whole payload, so the strongest proof is a round-trip: unwrap the shell single-quoting, `JSON.parse`, and assert the apostrophe-containing secret survives both layers intact.

**Fix:**
```ts
const inner = cmd.slice(cmd.indexOf("'") + 1, cmd.lastIndexOf("'

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/179) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Document getOrFetch undefined-value conflation assumption

**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Nit #1

**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts:148-151` — `get()` returns `undefined` for both an absent key and a stored `undefined` value, so a fetcher that legitimately resolves to `undefined` would never cache-hit. Harmless today (WHOOP responses are always objects).

**Fix:** Add a one-line comment noting the assumption so the cache is not silently reused for nullable values later.

**Priority:** Nit (backlog)

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/177) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### Remove or wire up the dead MemoryCache.invalidateAll() alias

**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Minor #3

**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts:131-133` — `invalidateAll()` is an alias for `clear()` carried over from the removed `ResourceCache` API, but nothing in `src/` calls it (the token-refresh site in `src/index.ts` calls `cache.clear()` directly). It survives only via its own unit test.

**Fix:** Either remove the alias (and its test) to shrink the public surface, or point the token-refresh call site at `invalidateAll()` so the alias earns its

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/176) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

### MemoryCache.clear() does not purge in-flight map; post-clear reader can receive pre-clear data

**Source:** code-review-checkpoint-13, Minor #1

**Problem:** `src/cache/memory-cache.ts` — `clear()` empties `store` and bumps `generation` but leaves the `inflight` map intact. A `getOrFetch(key)` issued after `clear()` but before the pre-clear fetch settles hits the still-present in-flight entry and resolves with the pre-clear value (returned once, not cached thanks to the generation guard). In the token-refresh path a request arriving right after `cache.clear()` can be served data fetched mi

[Read the thread](https://github.com/shashankswe2020-ux/whoop-mcp/issues/174) · 2026-06-13 · open · 0 comments

[See all 24 reports Pod holds for whoop](/mcp/whoop/issues) — of 86 qualified upstream.

## Firsthand observations

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