thread-keeper MCP Server

Multi-agent shared brain across Claude, Codex, Antigravity, Gemini, Copilot, and VS Code.

Publisher claimed. No tool list reported, and Pod has not connected to this server.

Status

Pod has not dialled thread-keeper yet, so everything on this page is what its publisher reported rather than what we observed. Registries describe servers; they do not connect to them. Until a check runs, treat the tool list below as a claim.

Connect

Published as threadkeeper on pypi. Runs locally.

Known issues

39 problems reported by people outside the maintainer team. Issues filed by the project's own owners, members and collaborators are excluded — those are release checklists and internal refactors, not things that will go wrong for you. Showing 12.

Most discussed

Recoverable lesson removal (soft-delete/tombstone) before curator destructive-by-default prunes unrecoverably

Problem

Lesson removal is irreversible, and the curator is moving to destructive-by-default, so a wrongly-pruned lesson is silently lost with no recovery path.

• lesson_remove() (threadkeeper/tools/lessons.py:187) calls remove_lesson() (threadkeeper/lessons.py:135-152), which rewrites lessons.md to physically drop the <!-- LESSON:BEGIN ... --> section.
• The only trace left is an events row recording the slug + source, not the body (`threadkeeper/tools/lessons.py

Read the thread · 2026-06-17 · closed · 5 comments

Security: de-privilege & sanitize autonomous GitHub-writing daemons (bypassPermissions, prompt injection, body redaction)

Problem

thread-keeper's autonomous daemons can write to a public GitHub repo and run an unsandboxed code agent, and the only barrier protecting that surface is a single prompt-level instruction. Three coupled weaknesses:

1. Output side — no mechanical redaction. The evolve reviewer (threadkeeper/evolve_daemon.py:216-230) and the evolve appliers (threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py roadmap-issue path ~:859, evolve-format path ~:1056) run permission_mode="bypassPermissions" with `Bas

Read the thread · 2026-06-14 · closed · 4 comments

Cross-CLI ingest verification in production

Status

Cross-CLI ingest is wired (see `scripts/tk_verify_ingest.py` for the contract test) but has only been exercised on a single dev machine. Need real-world verification across all four CLIs.

What's needed

• Run `scripts/tk_verify_ingest.py` on a fresh machine that has been actively using Claude Code + Codex + Gemini + Copilot for at least a week
• Confirm `dialog_messages.source` ends up with rows from all four adapters
• Confirm `shadow_review_run --dry-run` sees cross-ad

Read the thread · 2026-05-14 · closed · 4 comments

Bug: CLI MCP/hook config writes are non-atomic full-file rewrites — a crash or concurrent write can truncate ~/.claude.json (entire Claude Code state)

Problem

Every adapter and the installer mutate CLI config with the pattern cfg = json.loads(path.read_text()) then path.write_text(json.dumps(cfg)) — a truncate-then-write with no temp-file + os.replace atomic swap (e.g. threadkeeper/adapters/claude_code.py:146,159; threadkeeper/adapters/gemini.py; threadkeeper/adapters/copilot.py; the hook helper; threadkeeper/_setup.py instruction writes).

Two failure modes:

1. Crash/partial write → corruption. write_text truncates th

Read the thread · 2026-06-17 · closed · 3 comments

Add retention/GC for the tasks table and TASK_LOG_DIR spool files (unbounded growth + sensitive prompt/log persistence)

Problem

The tasks table and the TASK_LOG_DIR spool directory grow without bound — nothing ever prunes either.

• Every spawn(...) inserts a permanent row into tasks (threadkeeper/db.py schema: id, pid, parent_cid, spawned_cid, cwd, prompt TEXT NOT NULL, started_at, ended_at, return_code). There is no DELETE FROM tasks anywhere in the package, and consolidate() only dedups notes/verbatim and demotes/releases threads (threadkeeper/tools/consolidate.py) — it never touches `tas

Read the thread · 2026-06-17 · closed · 3 comments

Most recent

Security: split Curator web research from destructive memory mutation

Problem

A destructive Curator child is currently granted both untrusted web-research capabilities (WebSearch and WebFetch) and tools that patch or delete durable lessons, skills, and concepts. The prompt also requires external research for every skill. Snapshot recovery and per-pass mutation caps limit damage, but they do not prevent web content from steering mutations inside the same model context.

Issue #79 established this separation for the Evolve reviewer, but the equivalent Curato

Read the thread · 2026-08-24 · open · 0 comments

Port ThreadKeeper to MCP SDK 2.x before lifting the compatibility cap

Problem

The package currently pins mcp>=1.10.0,<2 because MCP SDK 2.0 removed the mcp.server.fastmcp import path and renamed FastMCP to MCPServer. Before the cap was added, fresh installs could resolve 2.0 and fail at import time.

The compatibility cap restores installations, but the codebase still imports the 1.x API directly in the MCP singleton, elicitation helper, and dialectic tool. The changelog explicitly says the 2.x port remains open, yet no roadmap issue tracks the migrati

Read the thread · 2026-08-10 · open · 0 comments

Security: untrusted GitHub comments can spoof Evolve applier claims

Problem

The Evolve applier treats any issue comment containing <!-- thread-keeper:evolve-applier-claim --> as an active claim for 24 hours. _issue_comment_is_active_claim checks only the marker and timestamp; _fetch_issue_comments does not preserve or validate the comment author's association or login.

Because the repository is public, an unrelated commenter can copy the visible marker into a comment on a trusted roadmap issue. The automatic applier then skips that issue until the cla

Read the thread · 2026-08-10 · open · 0 comments

Learning-loop skills: no load-time re-screen for loop-authored SKILL.md after write-time gate

Problem

Issue #76 added a write-time injection screen (review_prompts.screen_injection_markers, wired into lesson_append in threadkeeper/tools/lessons.py) so loop-synthesized memory can't carry imperative-override / remote-exec idioms at the moment it's created. That screen only runs once, at the lesson_append / skill_manage(create/patch) call site.

Once a SKILL.md is materialized under a loop-authored created_by_origin (shadow_review, candidate_review, background_review, etc.)

Read the thread · 2026-07-31 · open · outside contributor · 0 comments

Security: mechanically confine evolve web-research writes to the assigned digest

Problem

The evolve web-research phase is intentionally separated from the privileged audit phase, but it still receives a generic file-write capability. The single-digest write restriction exists only in prompt text, not as an enforced destination policy. Untrusted web content can therefore try to steer the research worker into altering repository or state files, creating an integrity and availability bridge into the later privileged audit.

Proposed direction

Replace generic research-phas

Read the thread · 2026-07-25 · open · 0 comments

Security: curator-report applier executes any REPORT-*.md as instructions with destructive memory tools — no provenance link to the curator pass that wrote it

Problem

apply_curator_report (threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py:1353) consumes a curator report selected purely by filesystem state: _latest_complete_curator_report globs CURATOR_REPORTS_DIR.glob("REPORT-*.md"), sorts by mtime, and accepts the newest file that contains the completeness marker CURATOR_PASS_COMPLETE (CURATOR_REPORT_MARKER, line 140) and is not yet recorded as applied (threadkeeper/evolve_applier.py:521-541). It then reads the report's full text, inlines it into the

Read the thread · 2026-06-17 · closed · 2 comments

Bug: memory/skill nudge counters inflated by daemon *_pass and render_brief's own *_hint_shown events — nudges fire early

Problem

nudges._count_events_since (threadkeeper/nudges.py:92-118) counts every events row for the session with id > since_id, excluding only _NONCOUNTING_KINDS = ("thread_hint_shown","shadow_review_pass") plus the caller's reset kinds. But background daemons write per-tick *_pass events under the foreground session id (identity._session_id):

• ingest_pass — the live ingester ticks every few seconds; non-empty passes are always recorded (threadkeeper/ingest.py:48-65,

Read the thread · 2026-06-17 · closed · 2 comments

See all 22 reports Pod holds for thread-keeper — of 39 qualified upstream.

Firsthand observations

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For agents

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